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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation studies the impact of consumer perceptions of tanking on 
National Basketball Attendance (NBA) attendance. The prevalence of tanking in the 
NBA raised concerns that some teams were purposely avoiding winning games in order 
to improve their draft position. The majority of previous studies on tanking have focused 
on developing empirical evidence of the existence of tanking in sport. Yet, no study 
systematically explored the impact of perceived tanking behavior on consumer demand 
for sport. As tanking teams rarely reveal their tanking strategy to the public, fans may not 
correctly identify tanking behavior in sport, and thus are likely to rely on their 
perceptions of tanking to make attendance decisions. The current dissertation employs 
tanking discussions on the social media platform Twitter along with data mining tools to 
quantify consumer perceptions of tanking. Econometric models are then utilized to 
analyze the effect of the perceived tanking behavior on demand for NBA games. The 
estimation results provide robust evidence that the increasing awareness of tanking for 
home teams hurts NBA attendance in both the short and long term. This dissertation also 
reveals that more negative attitudes toward visiting teams’ tanking behavior can 
undermine consumer interest in attending NBA games. These findings offer important 
managerial implications on the urgency of restraining tanking behavior as well as the 
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Game attendance has long been a vital part of the professional sports business 
model (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989; Neale, 1964). Consumers attending sporting events 
contribute substantial ticket revenue to sports teams and leagues (Szymanski & Késenne, 
2004). In addition, ancillary revenues such as merchandise sales and parking fees can 
also experience significant growth with high attendance (Mason, 1999). Key 
determinants of demand for sport are well documented in the literature (Borland & 
MacDonald, 2003; Villar & Guerrero, 2009). One such determinant is the quality of 
competition that generally encompasses the strength of the teams on the field and the 
uncertainty of game outcomes (Villar & Guerrero, 2009). For instance, prior studies of 
consumer demand for sport provide consistent evidence that team strength, normally 
measured by the team winning percentage, is positively linked to game attendance 
(Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Noll, 1974; Villar & Guerrero, 2009). That is, winning 
teams typically draw more fans to sporting events than losing teams. Furthermore, studies 
on the uncertainty of game outcomes find some evidence to support the hypothesis that 
demand for certain matches increases when game outcomes are unpredictable (Benz, 
Brandes, & Franck, 2006; Rascher, 1999; Rascher & Solmes, 2007).  
At the same time, the prevalence of tanking in sport threatens the quality of 
competitions and may impact demand for games through both undermining team strength 
and the uncertainty of game outcomes (Price, Soebbing, Berri, & Humphreys, 2010). In 
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North American sports leagues, tanking could occur when teams do not exert their best 
winning effort. They often tank in order to improve their draft position in the upcoming 
amateur entry draft (Soebbing & Mason, 2009; Soebbing, Humphreys, & Mason, 2013). 
This form of tanking emerges as a result of the draft system where the ability to acquire 
high draft picks is determined by teams’ regular-season win-loss record in reverse order 
(Soebbing et al., 2013). Tanking teams often field less competitive rosters, which 
therefore reduce team quality (McManus, 2019). With lower team quality, sports teams 
are more likely to lose games and also draw fewer fans to games. For example, after 
trading away high-quality players, the Miami Marlins drew mere 10,013 fans per game in 
2018, the lowest attendance for any Major League Baseball (MLB) team since 2004 
(Shafer, 2018). Teams like the Marlins also compromise the uncertainty of game 
outcomes by not fielding talented players, thereby not exerting maximum effort to win 
games and pursue a division, conference, or league championship (Soebbing & Mason, 
2009; Taylor &Trogdon, 2002). Thus, if unpredictability attracts fans to games in sports 
leagues, the tanking strategy employed by the Marlins may seriously hurt attendance 
(Duvall, 2018; Kendall & Lenten, 2017; Soebbing & Mason, 2009). As the success of 
sport business relies on fan support, the presence of tanking can damage the quality of 
competitions, and thus impose significant threats to sports leagues and teams. 
In addition to the compromised quality of competitions resulting from tanking, 
perceptions of tanking may further affect consumer demand for sport (Soebbing & Mason, 
2009; Price et al., 2010). If fans perceive the existence of tanking by teams and within 
sports leagues, then they may decide not to attend games or stop following a sport in 
general, regardless of whether teams are actually tanking or not (Soebbing & Mason, 
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2009; Price et al., 2010). This is certainly a possibility as most teams do not acknowledge 
tanking to the public (Aldridge, 2018). With limited information on which teams are 
deliberately tanking, consumers may not differentiate actual tanking from below-average 
performance on the field or court. Therefore, it is likely that they rely on their perceptions 
tanking to make attendance decisions (Soebbing & Mason, 2009). While some fans are 
not interested in watching tanking teams, others may fully support tanking as it can 
ultimately help teams gain competitive advantages in the long term through acquiring 
higher draft picks (Lenten, Smith, & Boys, 2018). In light of various opinions on tanking, 
there is a need to further understand the relationship between perceptions of tanking and 
consumer interest in sport. The dissertation utilizes the National Basketball Association 
(NBA), where tanking has been a concern for decades, as the research context to explore 
this relationship. 
Chapter 1 covers a variety of topics related to the background information on 
tanking, ranging from the definitions of tanking to draft reforms. The introduction serves 
as a basis for the later discussion on the relationship between consumer perceptions of 
tanking and demand for NBA games. To begin with, several definitions of tanking are 
compared and differentiated. 
1.1 DEFINITION OF TANKING 
Despite the prevalence of tanking in sport, its definition seems to be vague in 
literature. In fact, a range of studies have proposed different definitions of tanking 
(Balsdon, Fong, & Thayer, 2017; Lenten et al., 2018; Soebbing & Mason, 2009). To 
better explore tanking behavior in this dissertation, it is critical to first clarify the 
meaning of tanking. Soebbing and Mason (2009) defined tanking as the behavior of 
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teams deliberately losing games to improve draft position. This definition has been 
widely employed in numerous studies (e.g., Borland, Chicu, & Macdonald, 2009; Lenten 
et al., 2018; Motomura, Roberts, Leeds, & Leeds, 2016; Price et al., 2010; Soebbing et al., 
2013; Soebbing & Humphreys, 2013). Balsdon et al. (2007) had a slightly different 
definition in their study examining tanking behavior in college basketball. They noted 
tanking took place when participants did not exert the best effort in winning a conference 
tournament championship. They suggested that this tanking behavior might arise from 
two reasons: (a) preserving energy for the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) tournament, and (b) maximizing conference revenue by conceding the title to 
another conference team which then will receive an automatic bid to the NCAA 
tournament. Kendall and Lenten (2017) offered a broader definition of tanking than the 
previous two, considering tanking as an act of intentionally dropping points or losing 
games in order to gain competitive advantages.  
To better analyze the effect of consumer perceptions of tanking on demand for 
NBA games, Soebbing and Mason’s (2009) definition of tanking is adopted in this 
dissertation. As such, this dissertation focuses on examining tanking behavior where 
NBA teams deliberately lose games in order to acquire higher draft picks. Other 
definitions of tanking are not considered in this inquiry. 
1.2 LINK BETWEEN TANKING AND THE DRAFT SYSTEM 
The previous section noted some links between tanking and the draft system. In 
fact, the emergence of the tanking behavior in the NBA since the early 1980s could be 
traced back to the draft system that the league adopted in 1947 (Soebbing & Mason, 
2009). Initially, the draft policy was designed to promote competitive balance, or create 
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equal playing strength between league members (Forrest & Simmons, 2002; Sanderson & 
Siegfried, 2003). For instance, the reverse-order draft scheme helps the worst performing 
teams improve team quality through assigning the best draft prospect to them. After 
acquiring high quality young talent, the poor performing teams can shorten the team 
quality gap with other franchises. As such, the draft system serves to improve 
competitive balance in sports leagues, which is considered as a key determinant of 
demand for sport (Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003). However, the implementation of the 
draft system also creates an unintended consequence that teams may intentionally lose 
games to acquire the top draft pick (Soebbing & Mason, 2009). For instance, a range of 
studies have offered evidence that NBA teams are more likely to lose games after being 
eliminated from playoff contention, signaling that some NBA franchises are deliberately 
losing games for high draft picks (e.g., Price et al., 2010; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). 
1.3 AN OVERVIEW OF TANKING TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 
The previous section established a clear link between the draft system and tanking. 
This section further introduces three tanking tactics and two tanking strategies that teams 
may use to strategically lose games. 
1.3.1 TANKING TACTICS 
McManus (2019) summarized three tanking tactics in sport. The first is to trade 
away key players in exchange for promising young players or valuable draft picks that 
have the potential to develop into superior players and contribute wins to teams 
(McManus, 2019). In this process, teams intentionally assemble less competitive rosters 
in the hopes of losing more games and improving their draft position. To ensure the 
effectiveness of this tanking tactic, teams can also choose not to sign high-profile and 
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high-performing players in the free agent market. This practice can help teams save 
valuable financial resources while also reinforcing their goal of losing more games. 
Among the major professional sports leagues in North America, MLB teams often use 
this tactic (Sheinin, 2018). Due to the absence of a salary floor in MLB, setting a 
minimum amount of salary each team has to pay in a given season, it is easier for MLB 
teams to avoid signing high priced players in the free agent market as compared to teams 
in other leagues where a strict salary floor is a part of many league’s collective 
bargaining agreements (Sheinin, 2018). 
The second tanking tactic is resting healthy, key players. By resting top players 
and assigning more playing time to young and less experienced players, tanking 
franchises deliberately play a less competitive roster thereby making them more likely to 
lose games (McManus, 2019). Resting healthy players does not only improve teams’ 
odds of losing games and winning the draft lottery, but also gives young players 
opportunities to develop. These young players may have the potential to help teams gain 
competitiveness in the long term (Soebbing et al., 2013). 
The third tanking tactic is giving up games. For instance, Preston and Szymanski 
(2003) provided an example of Barbados intentionally kicked the ball into their own goal 
at the end of regulation in order to tie their match with Grenada at the Shell Caribbean 
Cup. Barbados had to win the game by two goals to advance to the next round, but only 
led by one goal when there were three minutes left on the game clock. Therefore, 
Barbados had to force the match into overtime so that they would have more time to 
score more goals. 
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1.3.2 TANKING STRATEGIES 
The previous section described three tanking tactics that teams could employ to 
purposely lose games. This section centers on discussing how teams may use these tactics 
to successfully deploy tanking strategies. McManus (2019) noted two tanking strategies 
that were widely employed by major professional sports teams. The first strategy is to 
intentionally lose games late in the regular season when teams are already eliminated 
from playing in the postseason (Price et al., 2010; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). After being 
eliminated from playoff contention, the benefit of winning additional games can be 
minimal (Soebbing et al., 2013). However, if teams lose more games and lower their 
standing in the league, they will have better opportunities to obtain a high draft pick 
under the reverse-order draft system (Soebbing et al., 2013). Thus, it is not surprising that 
teams may choose to tank once they lose the hope to compete in the postseason. 
This tanking strategy is often accomplished by resting key players (McManus, 
2019). Teams resting key players utilize less talented rosters on the court, which reduces 
the odds of winning games. Clearly, teams can also deliberately lose games by asking 
players not to exert the best effort in competition. However, given the competitive nature 
of sporting contests, players generally exert full effort to win games (McManus, 2019). 
For this reason, resting key players theoretically becomes the more effective tactic to 
deliberately lose games. Without key players on the field or court, the disparity in team 
quality between tanking teams and their opponents makes it more difficult for tanking 
clubs to win, even though players expend their best effort in competitions. 
Unlike the first tanking strategy that is often deployed toward the end of the 
season, the second tanking strategy is more extreme whereby teams attempt to 
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deliberately lose games for multiple seasons (McManus, 2019). Using the second tanking 
strategy often reflects management’s belief that rebuilding their franchise through the 
draft system is the best path to win championships (McManus, 2019). Rather than 
perpetually staying in the middle or bottom of a league’s standings, these teams 
purposely endure losing seasons in the hopes of maximizing their odds of acquiring the 
best young talent through the draft system (Motomura et al., 2016). After accumulating 
sufficient talent over time, teams are well positioned to contend for championships. 
This second strategy is often executed with tanking tactics such as trading away 
key players or avoiding signing high-profile free agents (Vamplew, 2018). By removing 
key players and not signing quality free agents, teams intentionally construct less 
competitive rosters in order to access higher draft position. Not only does the reduction of 
talent level improve draft position, but it also aids in acquiring additional draft picks and 
young talent from other franchises through player trades (McManus, 2019). High draft 
picks and young talent are invaluable assets because they may turn into high quality 
players and contribute numerous wins to the franchise in the long term (McManus, 2019).  
In practice, MLB and NBA teams had the history of using this tanking strategy to 
rebuild franchises (Lenten, 2016). In MLB, the Houston Astros tanked from the 2011 to 
2013 seasons. During this period of time, the Astros lost an average of 108 of 162 games 
per season and, as a result, received three consecutive first overall draft picks, along with 
other draft picks and young talent they acquired from team trades (Miller, 2018). In the 
meantime, the Astros significantly cut player payroll by not signing any high-profile 
player in the free agent market. After years of piling high draft picks and developing 
young talent through tanking, the Astros won the World Series in 2017. In the NBA, the 
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Philadelphia Sixers, under the leadership of General Manager Sam Hinkie, employed this 
tanking strategy from the 2013 to 2016 seasons (Steinberg, 2018). After trading away 
quality players, the Sixers only won 47 of 246 games they played over these three 
seasons. The poor win-loss record, however, allowed the Sixers to obtain two second and 
one first draft pick in the 2014-2016 NBA drafts. The Sixers also purposely accumulated 
high draft picks from trades they made with other NBA franchises. With these draft picks, 
the Sixers selected promising young players such as Joel Embiid and Ben Simmons, who 
helped improve the quality of the Sixers and led the team to the Eastern Conference 
Semifinals in 2019. 
1.4 TANKING IN THE NBA 
While tanking is not rare in the sport industry, perhaps the NBA has dealt with 
tanking more often than any other North American professional sports leagues (Soebbing 
& Mason, 2009). For this reason, this dissertation uses the NBA as the research context to 
examine the relationship between consumer perceptions of tanking and demand for sport. 
Here, a brief explanation of why tanking occurs more frequently in the NBA than other 
leagues and some notable NBA tanking incidents are discussed. 
With basketball games featuring only five players per team on the court, an 
individual basketball player can significantly influence game results (Sanderson & 
Siegfried, 2003; Soebbing & Mason, 2009). As such, NBA teams may have greater 
incentives to acquire high-quality talent via the draft than teams in other leagues as the 
presence of a superior basketball player may drastically improve team quality (Soebbing 
& Mason, 2009).  
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The NBA teams had a long history of employing tanking tactics and strategies 
discussed before to deliberately lose games. For instance, the Houston Rockets were 
alleged to have tanked late in the 1984 regular season in an attempt to acquire Hakeem 
Olajuwon in the 1984 NBA draft (Webb, 2012). Desiring to acquire Olajuwon through 
the draft, the Houston Rockets lost 14 of their last 17 regular-season games during the 
1983-84 season and successfully improved their draft position. Based on their season 
record, the Rockets finished the first half of the season winning nearly 50% of games. In 
the second half of the season, the team gave more playing time to its bench players and 
began losing games more frequently (Vaccaro, 2019). The Rockets eventually finished 
the season with a 29-53 record and received the first draft pick to Hakeem Olajuwon after 
winning the coin flip with the Portland Trail Blazers. The coin flip was the procedure 
used to determine the first overall pick at the time. It was between the last place team in 
each conference (Soebbing & Mason, 2009). 
A decade later, the San Antonio Spurs allegedly tanked during the 1996-1997 
season in order to draft Tim Duncan. They actively rested key players and completed the 
season with a 20-62 record. While this was not the worst record in the 1996-1997 NBA 
season, the Spurs fortunately won the draft lottery and used the first draft pick to select 
Tim Duncan in the 1997 draft (Dorsey, 2012). 
Generally, an NBA team’s decision to tank is not disclosed to the public. 
However, in certain cases, team executives later reveal their tanking philosophy to the 
media. For example, former Toronto Raptors general manager, Bryan Colangelo, publicly 
admitted that the Toronto Raptors attempted to tank in part of the 2011-12 season (Amick, 
2014). To improve their draft position, Colangelo noted that the Raptors sought to tank 
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by resting key players and assigning more playing time to young players. Mark Cuban, 
the owner of the Dallas Mavericks, also openly admitted that the Mavericks tanked 
during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 seasons (Bieler, 2018). To compete for better draft 
picks, the team purposely fielded a less competitive roster to increase their odds of losing 
games. 
1.5 NBA DRAFT REFORMS 
The NBA has well noted the tanking problem over the past decades. To address 
the issue, the league has conducted a number of draft reforms since its first use of the 
draft system in 1947 (NBA, 2017). However, none of these reforms seems to be effective 
as tanking still frequently takes place in the NBA. This section highlights the draft 
systems that the NBA has employed and explains why tanking continues to be a problem 
in the league after multiple reform attempts.  
1.5.1 REVERSE ORDER DRAFT 
The first NBA draft system was established in 1947 when draft picks were 
assigned to teams based on their win-loss records in reverse order. Teams also were 
allowed to forfeit their first-round draft pick and select a territorial player who came from 
the geographic area where the franchise was located. The use of territorial draft picks 
aimed to attract more local fans as the presence of ‘local heroes’ could significantly 
improve attendance (Brandes, Franck, & Nüesch, 2008; Yamamura, 2011). The territorial 
draft system was replaced by a full reverse-order draft format in 1966. Under the reverse-
order draft system, the first draft pick was determined by a coin flip between two worst 
performing teams in each of the West and East Conferences. The winner of the coin flip 
would receive the first draft pick and the loser would receive the second. The rest of the 
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draft picks were assigned to teams based on their regular season win-loss records in 
reverse order. 
1.5.2 EQUAL-CHANCE DRAFT LOTTERY 
The reverse-order draft system was used until 1985 when the NBA replaced it 
with the equal-chance draft lottery system. The new draft scheme gave each non-playoff 
team an equal chance of receiving the first draft pick. This draft reform arose from the 
concerns that teams were purposely losing games in order to improve their draft position 
under the reverse-order draft system (Gerchak, Mausser, & Magazine, 1995). These 
concerns reached a new height during the 1983-1984 season when the Houston Rockets 
deliberately lost their 14 of the last 17 regular-season games in order to draft Hakeem 
Olajuwon, a future member of the Basketball Hall of Fame (Soebbing & Mason, 2009).  
1.5.3 WEIGHTED DRAFT LOTTERY 
 The equal-change draft lottery format ultimately led to fears that it did not provide 
sufficient help for poor-performing teams to regain competitiveness, which was the 
original purpose of implementing draft systems in sports leagues (Bondy, 2007). 
Therefore, the NBA reformed the draft system again in 1990 (Soebbing et al., 2013). 
Specifically, the league launched a weighted lottery system that gave the worst 
performing team the best chance of acquiring the first draft pick, which is close to 
16.67%. The remaining non-playoff teams had decreasing odds to obtain the first pick 
based on the inverse of their final regular season standings.  
In 1993, the Orlando Magic won the draft lottery with only a 1.52% chance. 
Witnessing the unfolding of such an improbable outcome, the NBA decided to revise the 
draft lottery by increasing the probability for the worst-performing team to receive the 
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first draft pick from 16.67% to 25% in 1994 (Figure 1.1). The new weighted draft system 
remained intact until 2017 when the public worried that it incentivized numerous teams 
to tank for the entire season. Therefore, the NBA board of governors again voted to 
reform the weighed lottery draft by decreasing the odds for the top seed to receive the 
first draft pick in 2017 (Lowe, 2017). Under the new lottery draft system that was 
officially instituted in 2019, the bottom three teams shared the same 14% chance to win 
the draft lottery. The odds for the remaining non-playoff teams to win the lottery 
gradually decreased based on win-loss records (Figure 1.1).  
1.6 PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The purpose of this dissertation is to analyze the link between consumer 
perceptions of tanking and fan demand for NBA games. To explore this relationship, I 
analyze social media posts from Twitter to quantify consumer perceptions of tanking. 
Specifically, the two variables, namely, the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets, are 
constructed to represent perceptions of tanking. After the quantification of consumer 
perceptions of tanking, econometric models are employed to systematically explore how 









The following chapter discusses a wide range of literature that relates to the main 
themes of this dissertation. The first section highlights the differences between tanking 
and other similar concepts, including match fixing, rebuilding, and shirking. The second 
section reviews the studies showing empirical evidence of tanking. The next section 
discusses tournament theory, which has been employed to explain the rise of tanking in 
sport. The fourth section notes the key determinants of demand for sport in order to set 
the theoretical foundation for this dissertation. The last section considers social media 
research in the sport industry. 
2.1 TANKING AND OTHER SIMILAR CONCEPTS  
In discussing tanking, concepts like match fixing, rebuilding, and shirking are 
sometimes used interchangeably (Lenten et al., 2018; McManus, 2018; Vamplew, 2018). 
While these concepts share some similarities with tanking, a clear distinction has to be 
drawn here in order to better understand the nature of tanking in sport. 
2.1.1 TANKING AND MATCH FIXING 
Match fixing takes place when contestants attempt to fix game outcomes by 
reducing their effort in competitions (Blair, 2018). Preston and Szymanski (2003) 
summarized three types of match fixing, claiming tanking should be treated as a form of 
match fixing. In their categorization of match fixing, the first type often involves bribery 
that one team is willing to provide benefits to opponents or referees in order to obtain a 
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particular game outcome (Blair, 2018). For instance, in sports leagues using the 
promotion and relegation system, teams on the verge of being relegated may pay 
opponents or referees to ask for a win. In this case, match fixing occurs as marginal teams 
bribe opponents or referees in order to save themselves from being relegated to lower 
divisions. 
The second type of match fixing relates to gambling activities where players or 
officials gain financial benefits from a specific match result (Preston & Szymanski, 2003). 
For instance, the 1919 World Series between the Chicago White Sox and Cincinnati Reds 
was alleged to be controlled by gamblers. While the White Sox were considered as the 
overwhelming favorite, they lost the series. The belief was some White Sox players 
received money from gamblers to throw games. In this case, gamblers fixed game results 
in order to gain financial returns from betting markets (Anderson, 2001). 
The third type of match fixing occurs when manipulating game outcomes helps 
contestants obtain competitive benefits in the long term (Preston & Szymanski, 2003). 
Unlike the other two match-fixing practices, the third type may not be strictly prohibited 
by sports leagues, although it is certainly against the spirit of sport (McManus, 2019). 
Tanking fits this type of match fixing as it aims to produce a particular result that can 
help teams gain a favorable position in the draft (Preston & Szymanski, 2003). For 
instance, MLB teams have attempted to deliberately lose games in order to win high draft 
picks (Sheinin, 2018). With high-quality draft prospects, tanking teams expect to regain 
competitiveness or win championships in the near future. The Chicago Cubs tanked to 
obtain talent and subsequently won the World Series in 2016 (Sheinin, 2018). Before 
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securing the title, the Cubs lost an average of 96 games per season from 2011 to 2013 as 
they employed low-priced marginal talent. 
2.1.2 TANKING AND TEAM REBUILDING 
The word ‘tanking’ is often associated with the phrase ‘team rebuilding’ in the 
press (McManus, 2019). In general, sports leagues, teams, and media believe that tanking 
is an effective way to rebuild sports franchises (Motomura et al., 2016; Mullin, 2018; 
Sheinin, 2018). Tanking teams intend to restore competitiveness through high draft picks 
that they may acquire under the reverse-order draft system by deliberately losing games. 
However, not all tanking practices are favored by leagues to rebuild sports franchises. For 
instance, NBA commissioner Adam Silver noted that there was a clear distinction 
between effort teams might put forth to rebuild franchises, such as trading players, and 
actions teams might take on the court to lose games, such as deliberately missing shots or 
giving up on defense (Aldridge, 2018). The former can be accepted while the latter is 
clearly against league rules. According to Silver’s tanking comments, it appears the 
tanking tactic of trading away quality players is regarded as an acceptable action under 
league rules, whereas other tactics such as resting key players and throwing games seem 
to be inappropriate (Amick, 2018).  
Interestingly, Los Angeles Dodgers President Stan Kasten made similar 
comments regarding the distinction between tanking and team rebuilding (Aldridge, 
2018). He considered strategic tanking as a process of cutting payrolls and acquiring 
bright young players who, through years of training, could be developed into impactful 
athletes. In the rebuilding process, teams are willing to endure consecutive years of losses 
in order to regain competitiveness by acquiring talent and draft picks. However, he 
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viewed purposely losing games on the field as improper. Clearly, Kasten treated the 
tanking practice of trading superior players or not signing high-profile free agents as a 
reasonable way to rebuild sports franchises, but deliberately giving up games on the field 
as an unacceptable practice. 
To further highlight the link between tanking and team rebuilding, the NBA 
fining Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban during the 2017-18 season for his tanking 
comments provides a specific example to demonstrate the league’s stance on these two 
notions (Bieler, 2018). Specifically, Mark Cuban publicly admitted the Dallas Mavericks 
tanked during the 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 seasons. He also suggested losing was the 
best and quickest option for the franchise to regain competitiveness in the NBA. Shortly 
after the comments, the NBA fined Mark Cuban $600,000, stating that Cuban’s 
comments were detrimental to the NBA. Yet, in a memo sent to all NBA teams following 
Cuban’s tanking comments, the NBA noted it had no basis to conclude that Dallas 
Mavericks exerted less than the best effort to compete on the court (Aldridge, 2018). 
Mark Cuban also assured the league that he did not ask players or coaches to throw 
games to tank. In fact, Mark Cuban was fined because his comments might jeopardize the 
perceived integrity of competitions that the league attempted to protect by all means. 
Given the fact that the integrity of sport is the cornerstone of any sport, actions that 
undermine the actual and perceived integrity of the game should be penalized (McLaren, 
2011). Nevertheless, this incident illustrates that while not exerting maximum effort on 
the court is clearly against NBA rules, the league seems to consider strategic tanking as 
an acceptable practice, since the Dallas Mavericks trading away experienced players to 
tank did not receive penalties from the NBA. The rationale of fining Mark Cuban for his 
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tanking comments is consistent with what Adam Silver defined tanking that roster 
changes to rebuild franchises are inherently distinct from throwing games. 
2.1.3 TANKING AND SHIRKING 
Although tanking sometimes serves as an alternative word to shirking, these two 
notions are distinct from each other in the context of sport (Vamplew, 2018). In defining 
shirking, Vamplew (2018) suggested that shirking took place when contestants 
underperformed by not exerting their best effort in competition. Although tanking also 
involves contestants not expending maximum effort in games, shirking contestants do not 
necessarily aim to lose games (Vamplew, 2018). For instance, prior research sought to 
explain why players tended to shirk after signing long-term guaranteed contracts 
(Scroggins, 1993). This shirking behavior can be explained through the principle-agent 
theory in which the principles (teams) may not recognize the nuance between shirking 
and below-average performance, and thus allow the agents (players) to act 
opportunistically (Krautmann, 1990). In other words, long-term contracts disincentivize 
contestants to play with their best effort because stakeholders may not explicitly identify 
shirking behavior in practice (Berri & Krautmann, 2006). Thus, shirking players 
underperform because they do not have sufficient incentives to work hard, not that they 
intend to deliberately lose games in order to gain long-term competitive advantages like 
tanking teams do (Vamplew, 2018). 
2.2 EVIDENCE OF TANKING IN SPORT 
Tanking is a widespread phenomenon in sport (Kendall & Lenten, 2017). An 
abundance of studies developed evidence of tanking (e.g., Price et al., 2010; Taylor & 
Trogdon, 2002). In North American sports leagues, tanking is a particular concern in the 
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NBA (Soebbing & Mason, 2009). As NBA teams rarely reveal their tanking plan to the 
general public, scholars have sought to provide empirical evidence that teams deliberately 
lose games in the NBA. This section of the literature review will firstly review prior 
research seeking to prove the existence of tanking in the NBA. The rest of the section 
will cover empirical studies revealing the evidence of tanking in other sports leagues. 
2.2.1 EVIDENCE OF TANKING IN THE NBA 
The seminal study conducted by Taylor and Trogdon (2002) tested whether NBA 
teams were more likely to lose games after being eliminated from postseason contention. 
Looking at the 1983-1984, 1984-1985, and 1989-1990 NBA season data, Taylor and 
Trogdon (2002) found evidence that teams eliminated from playoff contention tended to 
lose more game late in the regular season under the reverse-order and weighted lottery 
draft systems. However, during the 1984-1985 season when the league adopted the equal-
chance draft lottery, there was no strong evidence of tanking. That is, teams ceased to 
compete for draft picks by intentionally losing games when each non-playoff team shared 
the same odds of winning the draft lottery. 
Price et al. (2010) explored the same research question as Taylor and Trogdon 
(2002) while employing a longer period of time. Using NBA data spanning from 1978 to 
2008, they drew similar conclusions as the Taylor and Trogdon’s (2002) study, except 
under the reverse-order draft format. In contrast to the Taylor and Trogdon’s (2002) 
finding that NBA teams tanked under the reverse-order draft system, Price et al. (2010) 
did not find strong evidence of tanking under this draft mechanism. They explained that 
this inconsistent result might emerge from different econometric models employed in 
these two studies. Nevertheless, Price et al. (2010) consolidated the evidence of tanking 
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in the NBA under the weighted lottery draft system but questioned the previous finding 
of tanking under the reverse-order draft format. 
Soebbing and Humphreys (2013) followed the previous two studies and 
developed evidence of tanking by using NBA betting odds data from the 2004-2005 to 
2008-2009 seasons. The betting market is chosen as the research context because it 
generally takes all available data, including any tanking information, into consideration 
when making predictions. Thus, if gamblers believed that tanking takes place in the NBA, 
they will adjust the betting odds accordingly. Following this premise, Soebbing and 
Humphreys (2013) tested whether bookmarkers would set different point spreads for 
games involving eliminated teams. They found strong evidence that there was a 
systematic change in point spreads, suggesting that the betting markets believed that 
tanking existed in the NBA. 
To further understand tanking in the NBA, Soebbing et al. (2013) explored 
whether tanking took place more often in NBA conference games, as compared to 
nonconference games. Considering that teams move down their standings faster when 
they lose to teams from the same conference than teams from the other conference, teams 
may have greater incentives to tank when facing conference opponents. After analyzing 
NBA data from the 1983-1984, 1984-1985, 1989-1990, and 1993-1994 seasons, 
Soebbing et al. (2013) concluded that NBA teams were more likely to tank in conference 
games than nonconference games under the weighted draft lottery adopted since 1994. 
For other draft systems, including the reverse-order draft, equal-chance draft, and the 
early weighed draft lottery imposed in 1990, there was no strong evidence that teams 
tanked more often in conference games than nonconference games. 
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Prior studies provide evidence of tanking in the NBA, particularly toward the end 
of the regular season (Soebbing et al. 2013). While the NBA attempted to eliminate 
tanking by tweaking draft formats, incentives to tank remained as a big concern for the 
league (Soebbing et al. 2013; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). Recently, the NBA passed 
another draft reform that would be implemented in 2019 (Ward-Henninger, 2017). The 
new draft policy aimed to further diminish teams’ incentives to tank as the league has 
observed certain extreme tanking cases (Greenstein, 2019). For example, unlike other 
NBA teams that have been accused of tanking late in the regular season, the Philadelphia 
Sixers were alleged to have tanked for several seasons from 2013 to 2016 (Steinberg, 
2018). The prevalence of tanking today raises concerns that tanking may undermine fans’ 
interest in the NBA. In light of such concerns and limited research on the topic, there is a 
need for further investigation on how tanking can affect consumer demand for NBA 
games. 
2.2.2 EVIDENCE OF TANKING IN OTHER SPORTS LEAGUES 
Outside the NBA, there also exists the evidence of tanking. Balsdon et al. (2007) 
noted that tanking might happen in college basketball where regular-season conference 
champions were less likely to win conference tournament championships. They 
suggested that such underperformance was plausibly motivated by two factors. First, 
teams were saving themselves for the NCAA tournament. For regular-season conference 
champions with guaranteed bids to the NCAA tournament, conference tournaments 
become meaningless. In fact, the earlier teams finished in conference tournaments, the 
more rest time they could receive. The second factor was financial gains from 
participating in March Madness. As the winner of conference tournaments often receives 
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an automatic bid to March Madness, regular-season conference champions losing 
conference tournaments to other conference members can allow more schools from the 
same conference as conference champions to participate in the NCAA tournament. With 
the NCAA distributing tournament revenue to conferences partially based on the number 
of schools selected into the tournament, and considering that some conferences equally 
distributed tournament revenue to their members, more participants in March Madness 
implies increased revenue for each member of a conference. After investigating these two 
possible motivations of tanking, Balsdon et al. (2007) concluded that the financial gain 
might be the primary motivation for regular-season champions to underperform in 
conference tournaments. 
Kendall and Lenten (2017) pointed out that tanking occurred even in mega 
sporting events like the Olympic Games. Specifically, they showed that women’s doubles 
badminton teams deliberately lost games at the 2012 Olympic Games in order to gain 
competitive benefits in the wider context of tournament play. Due to the timing of games, 
when two tanking teams faced each other, they had known whom they would compete 
against in the next rounds of the tournament. After knowing that the losing team would 
face weaker opponents, both teams actively sought ways to lose games. Noticing two 
teams not competing with their best winning efforts, the Badminton World Federation 
quickly disqualified both teams, claiming that their behavior was against the spirit of 
sports competition (Kendall & Lenten, 2017). 
Research indicates that tanking is pervasive in sport. Not only does the NBA 
suffer from tanking but also other sports leagues and tournaments around the world. 
Although it is clear that tanking undermines the quality of competitions, the damage that 
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tanking brings to sports leagues may be worse than what the existing research suggests 
(Soebbing & Mason, 2009). That is, fans who perceive the existence of tanking may 
question sports leagues’ credibility, and thus choose not to attend games. Given the 
pervasiveness of tanking in the sport industry, it is crucial to thoroughly investigate the 
effects of tanking on demand for sport. With the findings from this dissertation, sports 
leagues can better evaluate the consequences of tanking, and thus take actions to protect 
sports leagues’ credibility as needed. 
2.3 TOURNAMENT THEORY AND TANKING 
Preston and Szymanski (2003) suggested that tanking was largely caused by ill-
designed tournament rules. For most tanking cases in the NBA, these rules are the draft 
systems that the NBA has deployed since 1947. However, not all NBA draft systems give 
teams incentives to tank. For instance, prior research offered consistent evidence that the 
equal-chance draft system did not cause tanking in the NBA. In fact, the decision for 
teams to tank depends on the marginal benefit of the draft picks (Price et al., 2010; Taylor 
& Trogdon, 2002). When the value of the first draft pick is exceedingly higher than the 
rest of the draft picks, teams will likely exert stronger losing efforts to tank. To 
systematically explain why sports franchises have incentives to lose under certain NBA 
draft formats, tournament theory is used (Price et al., 2010; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). 
2.3.1 TOURNAMENT THEORY AND DRAFT SYSTEMS 
Tournament theory was originally developed to describe the rank-based 
compensation structures in corporations (Lazear & Rosen, 1981). For instance, this 
theory helps explain why CEOs often receive disproportionally higher salaries relative to 
managers. In a rank-based reward system, wages are determined by the relative rank 
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instead of the absolute value of outputs employees produce. For instance, CEOs’ salary is 
not calculated based on their absolute value of outputs. Rather, their rank in companies 
determines salary. Tournament theory predicts that, when employees’ actual production 
is difficult to monitor, the rank-based payment system is superior to the piece rate 
payment scheme that compensates employees based on their outputs (Lazear & Rosen, 
1981). For instance, it is difficult to quantify the absolute value of outputs that CEOs 
create for companies in practice. Thus, paying CEOs based their ranks rather than their 
absolute value of outputs is a rational compensation scheme. Not only does the rank-
based compensation system save the cost to monitor employees’ output, but it also 
ensures that employees will exert sufficient effort in the workplace (Lazear & Rosen, 
1981). Specifically, tournament theory suggests that employees’ effort level is 
determined by the prize gap in a rank-based reward system. Hence, setting the proper 
level of the prize gap between the winner and loser of a tournament can elicit ideal effort 
levels from participants. However, when organizers of a tournament set an overly high 
prize gap, such a reward structure may create a substantial financial burden for organizers. 
On the contrary, if the prize gap is too small, contestants may not put forth enough effort 
in competition. 
Some draft systems in professional sports leagues resemble a rank-based 
compensation system, with draft picks as rewards. For instance, the reverse-order draft 
format allocates the rewards, draft picks, to teams based on their regular-season 
performance in reverse order. Tournament theory predicts that teams will exert 
significant losing effort to compete for draft picks when the marginal benefit of draft 
picks exhibits a nonlinear structure (Price et al., 2010). Thus, the key to determining 
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whether draft systems motivate teams to tank is centered on the value of draft picks. 
Soebbing and Humphreys (2013) noted the value of draft picks came from two main 
areas. The first area is additional team wins and related revenue generated by draft 
prospects. High draft picks, particularly the first draft pick, are expected to contribute 
many wins to teams, and thus help the team generate more revenue through improved 
team performance (Price et al., 2010). The second area lies in the advertising effect of top 
draft prospects. Price et al. (2010) estimated the presence of the first draft pick itself 
could bring $2.8 million in revenue to teams that selected the prospect. Given these 
estimations of the value of NBA draft picks, Price et al. (2010) concluded the reverse-
order draft format did not create a nonlinear structure of the value of draft picks. Thus, 
NBA teams will not have incentives to tank under the reverse-order draft scheme based 
on tournament theory. Meanwhile, Price et al. (2010) illustrated the nonlinear structure of 
the probabilities under weighted draft lottery which created incentives for teams to tank.. 
2.3.2 APPLICATION OF TOURNAMENT THEORY IN SPORT 
Tournament theory is commonly used to study the effectiveness of policies in 
sports leasgues (Connelly, Tihanyi, Crook, & Gangloff, 2014). In particular, some 
scholars employ tournament theory to test whether the design of tournaments elicits the 
optimal level of effort from participants. Outside major professional sports leagues, 
McClure and Spector (1997) applied tournament theory to examine team behavior in the 
NCAA basketball tournament. As tournament theory suggests that actors’ level of effort 
solely depends on the prize spread, they speculated that contestants in March Madness 
would expend different levels of effort in response to various prize structures that 
conferences adopted to distribute tournament revenue. In particular, certain conferences 
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largely allocate tournament revenue to schools which take part in the tournament, while 
other conferences tend to evenly distribute tournament revenue to all conference 
members. Although schools had various tournament reward structures, McClure and 
Spector (1997) did not find strong empirical evidence that schools subject to disparate 
revenue-sharing rules performed differently in the tournament. Such an indifferent 
response demonstrated that conference revenue sharing policies did not affect contestants’ 
effort in the tournament. McClure and Spector (1997) further explained that while 
schools faced different reward structures, the real contestants, student athletes, would not 
receive any extra compensation, regardless of their tournament performance. Hence, 
conference revenue sharing policies did not create different incentives for players to 
compete in March Madness. 
Von Allmen (2001) employed tournament theory to explain the rationale behind 
the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing’s (NASCAR) reward scheme. 
Compared to the PGA Tour, NASCAR adopted a relatively constant reward structure 
where the reward for the winner of a race was only slightly higher than the prizes 
received by other contestants. As tournament theory predicts that a contestant’s level of 
effort depends on the prize gap, there were some concerns that NASCAR’s constant 
reward structure might not elicit considerable effort from drivers. To address these 
concerns, Von Allmen (2001) pointed out that the implementation of a linear reward 
system in NASCAR was primarily aimed to restrain reckless driving behavior. When cars 
crash during contests, car sponsors will miss advertising opportunities. Sponsorship as 
the main revenue source for many NASCAR teams may be withdrawn if sponsored teams 
cannot provide sufficient exposure to sponsors’ brands. To maintain the visibility of 
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advertisements, implementing a relatively linear prize structure can potentially reduce the 
number of car accidents on the track, and thus help teams and leagues retain sponsorship 
revenue. Thus, the relatively constant reward structure in NASCAR should be considered 
as an efficient policy as it ensures the sustainable development of the league. 
While the theoretical explanations of tanking are extensively studied, little 
research sheds light on the connection between tanking and demand for attendance. To 
explore the impact of tanking on attendance in this dissertation, a thorough literature 
review on the economic theory of demand for sport is needed in order to establish a solid 
theoretical foundation for this research (Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Villar & Guerrero, 
2009). 
2.4 DEMAND FOR ATTENDANCE 
The economic theory of demand for sport has been widely applied to study 
motives for fans attending sporting events (Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Villar & 
Guerrero, 2009). The theory is an extension of the consumer demand model that 
describes the choices of buying goods and services under constrained resources (Borland 
& MacDonald, 2003). Most demand studies have employed attendance at sporting events 
to measure consumer demand for sport (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). A growing line of 
research uses televised viewership as a proxy for consumer demand for sport (e.g., 
Tainsky, 2010; Feddersen & Rott, 2011). The rise of studies using viewership to explore 
demand for sport can be ascribed to the availability of broadcasting data (Feddersen & 
Rott, 2011; Tainsky & McEvoy 2012; Tainsky, 2010; Salaga & Tainsky, 2015). 
Compared with attendance data that only reflects ticket sales in the home market, 
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viewership data captures demand for sport in the home, away and neutral markets, 
providing researchers with a more disaggregated dataset to examine (Tainsky, 2010).  
While research using television ratings to study demand for sport has gained 
momentum, this dissertation will employ attendance to examine the effect of consumer 
perceptions of tanking on consumer interest in the NBA, considering the availability of 
historical NBA attendance data. In reviewing consumer demand for attendance, Borland 
and MacDonald (2003) summarized five major determinants of demand for attendance, 
including consumer preferences, economic factors, quality of viewing, supply capacity, 
and the quality of sporting contests. Given the importance of understanding the demand 
model in this dissertation, the current section follows Borland and MacDonald’s 
categorizations to review five major variable categories that will significantly affect fans’ 
decisions to attend sporting contests. 
2.4.1 CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
Consumer preferences can take several forms (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). For 
instance, some fans develop a habit of attending games over the years. Such loyal fans 
are likely to support home teams by attending games, regardless of the performance of 
their teams. Lee (2006) pointed out that, in contrast to young sports leagues, consumers 
from established sports leagues were less concerned with the quality of competitions. In 
fact, historical sports franchises are often supported by loyal fans, some of whom 
regularly attend games, even though teams they support struggle to win games (Coates & 
Humphreys, 2005).  
Empirical analyses of consumer demand for sport often employed the age of the 
franchise or one-year lagged attendance as a proxy of fan loyalty or habit (Ahn & Lee, 
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2007; Winfree, McCluskey, Mittelhammer, & Fort, 2004). While a number of studies 
provided consistent evidence that the age of the sports franchise and fan loyalty could 
positively affect game attendance, the calculation of the age of the team requires special 
attention (Ahn & Lee, 2007; Borland & Lye, 1992; Coates & Harrison, 2005). 
Specifically, team relocation can complicate the calculation of the age of the sports 
franchise. For instance, in the National Football League (NFL), the Oakland Raiders 
moved to Los Angeles in 1982, but returned to Oakland in 1994. Although the Raiders 
continually used the same nicknames over the years, scholars often considered them as 
three distinct teams. Hence, in determining the age of the team, the 1994-1995 season 
was often deemed as the inaugural season for the returning Oakland Raiders (Coates & 
Humphreys, 2002). 
2.4.2 ECONOMIC FACTORS 
A wide range of economic factors are proposed as determinants of demand for 
sport (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). First, the law of demand predicts that ticket prices 
are negatively correlated with attendance. Yet, empirical research provided mixed results 
in evaluating the impact of ticket prices on attendance. For instance, Rivers and 
DeSchriver (2002) showed there was a positive relationship between season average 
ticket prices and annual MLB attendance, while other research suggested fans bought 
fewer tickets when ticket prices increased (Fort, 2006). To address why studies reached 
contrary conclusions regarding the relationship between ticket prices and demand for 
attendance, Krautmann and Berri (2007) noted that ticket prices might not be the actual 
cost of attending a sporting event. Other related costs such as food and travel should be 
added to the total cost of attending a game. Hence, a few studies begun to utilize the Fan 
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Cost Index (FCI) that contained a more complete description of the costs of attending 
sporting events in analyzing the relationship between costs and demand (Coates & 
Humphreys, 2007; Gitter & Rhoads, 2010; Krautmann & Berri, 2007). Yet, studies 
employing the FCI as a measure of the cost of attending sporting events did not reach 
consensus (Krautmann & Berri, 2007). For instance, Coates and Humphreys (2007) 
concluded the FCI was negatively related to attendance in the NBA, but insignificant in 
the NFL and MLB.  
Second, market size can affect demand for sport. Big market teams with more 
population face higher demand for sporting events than small market teams (Noll, 1974). 
Less clear is the link between income levels and demand for sport. The consumer demand 
model predicts that higher income consumers are willing to purchase more normal goods 
and less inferior goods. In the context of sport, if sporting events are regarded as normal 
goods, fans from affluent areas will have higher demand for sport than fans from poor 
regions. However, studies examining the link between income levels and demand for 
sport produced mixed results. For instance, Lee (2004) noticed that baseball was 
considered as a normal good in Japan, Korea, and the USA but Fort and Rosenman (1999) 
pointed out that baseball was only viewed as a normal good in the National League of 
MLB, not in the American League. Noll (1974) also posited that baseball was an inferior 
good as his empirical test showed a negative relationship between income levels and 
MLB game attendance.  
The presence of entertainment alternatives is another factor that can impact 
demand for sport (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). With the availability of more 
entertainment activities, sports teams will face fiercer competition in drawing fans to 
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games. Such competition may arise from multiple sources (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). 
First, sports teams compete with clubs from other leagues that play the same sport. For 
example, scholars uncovered that minor league and junior league hockey teams served as 
primary cross-league substitutes for National Hockey League (NHL) fans during the 
NHL lockout season in 2004 (Winfree & Fort, 2008). Second, sports teams from cross-
sports leagues also compete with NHL teams for consumers. Rascher, Brown, Nagel, and 
McEvoy (2009) estimated that the NHL lockout in 2004 increased NBA attendance by 
2%. Third, there is strong evidence that sports franchises compete with teams from the 
same league and geographic area for fans. For instance, incumbent teams will experience 
a significant increase or decrease in attendance when other sports clubs from the same 
league enter or exit the territory, either through expansion or relocation (Winfree, 2009). 
Lastly, other entertainment activities, such as theater or cinema, are often deemed as 
substitutes for sporting events. While there is little academic research examining fan 
substitution to other forms of entertainment activities, anecdotal evidence showed that the 
MLB strike in 1994 considerably improved movie sales in that year (Winfree, 2009). 
2.4.3 QUALITY OF VIEWING 
The quality of viewing is a particular concern for many sports spectators. A range 
of factors affect the quality of viewing in a sporting event. First, the age of the facility 
can affect consumer experience at sporting events. A newly constructed stadium typically 
attracts a fair amount of spectators in the beginning years of operation. However, such a 
“novelty effect” can quickly vanish as attendance drops in the following years (Clapp & 
Hakes, 2005; Coates & Humphreys, 2005; McEvoy, Nagel, DeSchriver, & Brown, 2005; 
Leadley & Zygmont, 2005). It also appears that the attendance can spike in the last years 
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of operation of a stadium due to the “nostalgia effect” (Coates & Humphreys, 2007; 
McEvoy et al., 2005).  
Game day weather conditions also play a significant role in determining demand 
for sport. Especially for outdoor sports such as baseball, soccer, and cricket, adverse 
weather may discourage fans from attending contests because of low viewing quality. 
Even for indoor sports, poor weather conditions can create an unpleasant customer 
experience due to increased travel costs. Empirical studies of the impact of weather on 
attendance found consistent evidence that rainy weather on game days would 
significantly reduce attendance (Hynds & Smith, 1994). 
Game time is critical to demand for sport (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). In 
general, sporting contests scheduled on weekends or holidays will have larger crowds 
than games scheduled on other days (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989; Hill, Madura & Zuber, 
1982; McDonald & Rascher, 2000). Prior studies suggested that consumers had more 
time to participate in leisure activities during weekends and holidays. Furthermore, 
research showed that afternoon games would have lower attendance than night games 
(Hansen & Gauthier, 1989). While afternoon games are uncommon in today’s sport 
industry, before World War II, the majority of baseball games took place in the daytime 
(Quinn, 2009). To meet the demand for baseball games from the working-class during 
wartime, baseball games were then moved to the late afternoon and night when the 
working class had enough time to attend games (Quinn, 2009). 
2.4.4 SUPPLY CAPACITY 
The fourth category is the supply capacity (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). In live 
sporting events, the number of tickets teams can sell is constrained at the facility’s 
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capacity. At sellouts, the actual demand for sporting events cannot be observed as the 
quantity of available tickets is limited. Among four major sports leagues in North 
America, game tickets are often sold out except for MLB (Quirk & Fort, 1997). Sell-out 
events are also fairly common in European top-level soccer leagues such as the English 
Premier League (EPL; Koning, 2000). Given the pervasiveness of sellouts in sport, it is 
crucial to consider censored attendance when analyzing determinants of demand for 
attendance. Otherwise, statistical models may produce biased estimations (Humphreys & 
Johnson, 2020). To correct censored attendance, some studies treated the capacity as an 
explanatory variable in statistical models (Jones, 1984). However, such an adjustment 
seems to be problematic as including the capacity as an independent variable in demand 
models still produces biased estimators (Cairns, Jennett, & Sloane, 1986). DeSchriver, 
Rascher, and Shapiro (2016) developed interval regression to account for the censor 
attendance data. Other studies chose to correct for unobserved attendance by employing 
the censored normal regression model (Amemiya, 1973; Welki & Zlatoper, 1994). It is 
suggested that estimators from the censored normal regression model will be less biased 
(Welki & Zlatoper, 1994). For instance, Humphreys and Johnson (2020) adopted the 
censored normal regression model to estimate the effect of star power on attendance, 
considering numerous sellouts in the NBA. 
2.4.5 QUALITY OF SPORTING CONTESTS 
One of the key components of the quality of sporting contests is team strength 
(Borland & MacDonald, 2003). It is suggested that sports fans prefer to watch or attend 
sporting events featuring high quality teams. Empirical analysis provided consistent 
evidence that attendance soars when the quality of home teams is high (Villar & Guerrero, 
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2009). However, the impact of the quality of visiting teams on attendance is less clear. 
Some studies showed a positive relationship between the quality of away teams and 
attendance, whereas others did not find a significant connection between the quality of 
visiting teams and demand for sport (Buraimo & Simmons, 2008; Villar & Guerrero, 
2009). To quantify team strength, a variety of metrics were employed. The most common 
one is the team winning percentage or standing (Forrest & Simmons, 2002). More 
recently, a study conducted by Mills, Salaga, and Tainsky (2016) employed a team rating 
metric named Elo that took more information such as home court advantage and margin 
of victory into consideration. Therefore, the Elo rating system may better reflect true 
team strength than the team winning percentage or standing (Mills et al., 2016). 
Tanking teams are often associated with poor team quality as they purposely 
assemble less talented rosters to compete (Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). This action of 
assembling less talented rosters is particularly true for teams seeking to tank for entire 
seasons. By trading away key players and avoid signing quality free agents, tanking 
teams deliberately compromise their team strength, and thus may hurt fan interest in 
games (McManus, 2019). In addition, some teams decide to tank toward the end of the 
regular season. This tanking strategy is to deliberately field less competitive rosters that 
may further deter fans from attending sporting events. 
The quality of sporting contests is also determined by the presence of star players 
(Villar & Guerrero, 2009). Considering that NBA teams only field five players on the 
court and athletes do not wear gear such as helmets that may hide their faces from the 
spotlight, NBA star players can draw considerable attention from fans (Berri, Schmidt, & 
Brook, 2004; Hausman & Leonard, 1997). Empirical analyses of star power on NBA 
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attendance provided consistent evidence that the presence of star players was positively 
related to game attendance (Berri et al., 2004; Hausman & Leonard, 1997; Jane, 2016). 
Outside the NBA, Buraimo and Simmons (2015) found the significant impact of star 
players on attendance in the EPL. In individual sports such as tennis and the Ultimate 
Fighting Championship (UFC), star status was also an important predictor of demand for 
sport (Chmait et al., 2020; Reams & Shapiro, 2017). 
Uncertainty of game outcomes makes up the other dimension of the quality of 
sporting contests. The Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis (UOH) predicts game 
uncertainty positively relates to demand for sport (Rottenberg, 1956; Neale, 1964). In 
other words, fans prefer more unpredictable events than certain outcomes. This 
hypothesis was recently challenged by the study conducted by Coates, Humphreys, and 
Zhou (2014) who suggeste home team fans might dislike uncertain home games due to 
loss aversion. Notably, loss aversion assumes that the utility lost from a team loss is 
higher than the utility gained from a team win. Based on this assumption, Coates et al. 
(2014) concluded unpredictable games might lead to lower attendance than predictable 
matches.  
To measure the uncertainty of game outcomes, there exists two metrics that are 
particularly relevant to this dissertation. The first metric attempts to quantify league win 
distribution. For instance, the Ratio of Actual Standard Deviation to the Idealized 
Standard Deviation (RSD) has been widely employed to describe the dispersion of team 
wins in sports leagues for a given season (Noll, 1988). The high RSD implies an 
unbalanced league where matches lack unpredictability (Fort & Quirk, 1995). Recently, 
Lee, Kim, and Kim (2018) suggested that RSD could be a biased measure of competitive 
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balance when the number of games played within sports leagues was large. To correct the 
bias, they proposed a new competitive balance metric, the Bias-Corrected Standard 
Deviation (BCSD), which better captured league-wide competitive balance than RSD. 
Unlike RSD, BCSD is not subject to the number of matches teams play in a given season, 
and thus may be better employed to compare competitive balance across leagues and 
seasons that may host various number of games (Lee et al., 2018). 
The second measure of game uncertainty measures the closeness of individual 
competitions. For example, the absolute difference between the home and away team’s 
winning percentage prior to a game is considered as a valid proxy for game uncertainty 
(Meehan, Nelson, & Richardson, 2007). In addition, betting odds or point spreads from 
gambling markets are widely applied to measure game uncertainty (Buraimo & Simmons, 
2008; Coates & Humphreys, 2010; Forrest & Simmons, 2002). While betting odds or 
point spreads may not always fully reflect true game uncertainty, they are considered as 
better estimators of the team quality gap than other metrics, as bookmakers of betting 
odds or point spreads have strong financial incentives to make as accurate predictions as 
possible (Forrest, Goddard, & Simmons, 2005). 
In general, tanking undermines the uncertainty of game outcomes (Soebbing & 
Mason, 2009). If outcome uncertainty is a driving force of game attendance, the presence 
of tanking teams in sports leagues may hurt consumer demand for sport. An abundance of 
studies found evidence that tanking teams are more likely to lose games than they would 
have, implying that game uncertainty is compromised when participants do not exert their 
best effort in contests (Price et al., 2010; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002).  
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While the literature clearly indicated that tanking undermined the quality of 
sporting contests by threatening both team strength and the uncertainty of game outcomes, 
none of the prior research examines the link between consumer perceptions of tanking 
and their connections to demand for sport (Price et al., 2010). To address the gap, this 
dissertation analyzes consumer behavior in response to the existence of tanking in sports 
leagues. Such an inquiry provides useful insights in understanding the change of fan 
interest in sport when sports leagues’ creditability is in jeopardy. 
2.4.6 DEMAND FOR NBA ATTENDANCE 
While five major determinants of demand of sport were well documented in 
sections 2.4.1 to 2.4.5, recent work of analyzing demand for NBA attendance seem scant. 
The most popular studies within the context of the NBA were to examine the effect of 
star power on attendance. With the relatively small number of players required in the 
game of basketball, the NBA served as a great context to understand the importance of 
star players in drawing fans (Berri & Schmidt, 2007; Hausman & Leonard, 1997; 
Humphreys & Johnson, 2020; Jane, 2016). In addition, a few studies investigating the 
impact of game uncertainty on demand selected the NBA as the research context (Mills et 
al., 2016). For instance, Rascher and Solmes (2007) examined NBA data and found 
evidence to support the UOH that fans preferred more uncertain games than predicable 
ones. The long-standing NBA was also considered as a great context to study the 
relationship between facility age and demand for sport. For example, both Coates and 
Humphreys (2005) and Leadley and Zygmont (2005) noted the novelty effects of new 
areas in attracting NBA fans. 
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Among the aforementioned studies of NBA attendance, a few factors were widely 
employed as control variables. For instance, most NBA attendance studies used team 
quality, population, income level, market competition, and game time to control for their 
effects on consumer interest in the NBA (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989). The results 
generally showed that these factors were significant predictors of NBA attendance. For 
instance, studies employed the team winning percentage as a proxy for team quality 
revealed that both home and visiting team quality were positively related to NBA teams 
demand (Mongeon & Winfree, 2012). Similarly, NBA teams located in markets with a 
bigger population, higher income, and fewer other professional sports teams largely 
experienced higher demand for NBA games (Coates & Humphreys, 2005; Coates & 
Humphreys, 2007; Mongeon & Winfree, 2012). Lastly, weekend and holiday NBA 
games could expect significantly higher demand than matches in other time slots 
(Humphreys & Johnson, 2020). Given the above observations, it is therefore crucial to 
control for these variables when examining the link between perceptions of tanking and 
demand for NBA attendance in this dissertation. 
2.5 SOCIAL MEDIA AND SPORT 
The emergence of social media has drastically changed the way sports fans 
consume sports media products (Billings, Broussard, Xu, & Xu, 2019). In the past, the 
traditional media such as newspapers and TV mainly served as a means to distribute 
sports content to broad audiences (Boyle & Haynes, 2002). That is, sports fans passively 
received information from these traditional media firms. The advent of social media 
platforms such as Facebook and Twitter allow fans to create their own sports content 
(Pegoraro, 2014). Thus, in the era of social media, sports fans do not only consume sports 
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products from traditional media companies, but also actively generate sports content and 
distribute it to other social media users. As such, social media data has been widely 
studied and used in understanding consumer opinions on products and services. This 
section sheds light on research using social media data to address research questions in 
the sport industry. 
Filo, Lock, and Karg (2015) noted a few types of sports social media research that 
is fairly relevant to the present dissertation. First, a handful of studies examined 
consumer behavior on social media. For instance, Watanabe, Yan, and Soebbing (2015) 
examined key factors that affected the change of Twitter followers of MLB teams. 
Through analyzing Twitter follower data and performing a regression analysis, they 
concluded that factors such as the content of social media messages, certain calendar 
events, and postseason appearances were significant in drawing Twitter followers. 
Watanabe, Yan, and Soebbing (2016) further analyzed the statistical relationship between 
the total number of followers of MLB teams on Twitter and team characteristics. They 
offered evidence that the aggregate popularity (Twitter followers) of all starting players 
had a significantly positive impact on the change of Twitter followers of a team in the 
short term, implying that MLB players maintaining active Twitter accounts were crucial 
to attracting fans to team Twitter accounts. However, in models using the total number of 
Twitter followers of teams as the dependent variable, the authors did not find such a 
relationship. This suggested that sports franchises needed strategic plans to connect with 
fans in order to achieve lasting popularity on Twitter. The above two studies using 
Twitter data were valuable in understanding how to effectively build sport brands on 
digital platforms. Additionally, Watanabe, Yan, Soebbing, and Pegoraro (2017) 
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employed Twitter data to investigate discrimination issues in MLB. Through analyzing 
the total number of player followers on Twitter, they showed that Hispanic MLB players 
in general had much fewer followers than their counterparts on Twitter, indicating 
potential consumer bias toward Hispanic baseball athletes.  
The second line of social media research in sport centers on analyzing sentiments 
expressed in social media posts. In particular, researchers took various methods to extract 
sentiments from social media data in an attempt to understand consumer feelings on 
products and services. First, a number of studies chose to manually analyze social media 
content. For instance, Delia and Armstrong (2015) used Twitter data to analyze 
sponsorship effectiveness in the 2013 French Open. After collecting 1,138 tweets 
containing sponsor names, they manually labeled each with positive and negative 
sentiments. They concluded that almost all tweets mentioning sponsors contain positive 
sentiments. Burton (2019) sought to understand consumer sentiment toward ambush 
marketing and used Twitter data from the 2018 Fédération Internationale de Football 
Association (FIFA) World Cup Finals as the context to address the research questions. He 
gathered 2,136 Twitter posts and asked two coders to manually label each tweet with one 
of the sentiments, negative, neutral, and positive. After calculating the average sentiment 
of tweets, he concluded that consumer attitudes toward non-sponsor campaigns during 
the World Cup were exceedingly more positive than sponsor campaigns, highlighting that 
ambush marketing might not be as immoral as previously thought. 
  Another popular method to estimate sentiments in social media posts is the 
lexicon-based approach that uses a pre-defined dictionary of positive and negative words 
(Hong & Skiena, 2010). The sentiment is derived by counting the number of positive 
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words minus the number of negative words in a message. A handful of studies in sport 
have adopted this approach to estimate sentiments in social media posts (Chang, 2019; 
Yu & Wang, 2015). For instance, Chang (2019) explored the relationship between sports 
spectators’ emotional reaction and team performance in Super Bowl 50 through Twitter 
data. He used a lexicon-based method to estimate sentiments in Twitter posts. In sum, he 
noted fans showed strong positive emotions when their supporting teams scored and 
negative emotions when opponents scored. While such emotions diminished in intensity 
as teams continued to score, a surge of emotions was observed when supporting teams 
scored after a touchdown from opposing teams. 
Similarly, Yu and Wang (2015) studied American fans’ emotional responses 
toward the 2014 FIFA World Cup matches by using real-time Twitter data. After 
analyzing sentiments extracted from live tweets posted during the World Cup by using a 
lexicon-based method, they found evidence American fans primarily exhibited negative 
sentiments such as fear and anger throughout the games that Team USA played. Such 
negative emotions faded away when Team USA scored but were enhanced when 
opponents scored.  
Schumaker, Jarmoszko, and Labedz (2016) employed Twitter data to predict 
match outcomes and goal spreads in the English Premier League. Specifically, they used 
a software named CentralSport, a lexicon-based program to collect Twitter data and 
analyze sentiments in tweets. Evidence showed that sentiments hidden in tweets could 
effectively predict game outcomes and goal spreads, implying how fans perceive games 
was useful information in understanding the nature of sport competition. 
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The final approach to understand sentiments in social media content is the 
machine learning method where statistical models are used to learn patterns in textual 
data from a training set and then applied to predict sentiments in remaining datasets. 
While scant sports social media studies adopted the machine learning approach, a wide 
range of research from other fields have greatly relied on machine learning models to 
analyze social media content. For instance, Kang, Yoo, and Han (2012) used the machine 
learning model Naïve Bayes to estimate sentiments in restaurant reviews. The authors 
collected 70,000 restaurant reviews from various websites and were able to correctly 
identify sentiments in 81% of the reviews by using machine learning models. McGurk, 
Nowak, and Hall (2019) analyzed inventor sentiment expressed in tweets and its 
relationship with stock returns. After estimating sentiments in 3.9 million tweets by using 
Naïve Bayes models, they found evidence that investor emotion embedded in social 
media posts could successfully predict stock directions. 
Despite diverse techniques researchers may use to identify sentiments in social 
media content, the above sports social media studies demonstrate that social media data 
contains valuable information regarding consumer attitudes toward products and services 
(Filo et al., 2015). Following this observation, it is fair to argue that social media 
platforms may also contain thoughts and opinions reflecting consumer perceptions of 
tanking. As such, this dissertation will draw data from social media posts to gauge 
consumer perceptions of tanking and study its relationship with demand for sport. 
In sum, a thorough literature review shows that the prior studies of tanking have 
focused on developing evidence of tanking. However, there has been limited research 
examining the link between perceptions of tanking and demand for attendance. To 
 44
address this research gap, attention is placed on the NBA where concerns over tanking 
have existed for decades (Soebbing & Mason, 2009). Following the economic theory of 
demand for sport, this dissertation seeks to evaluate how perceptions of tanking will 
impact NBA attendance. The social media research in sport management has offered 
evidence that discussions on social media platforms may reflect how sports fans perceive 
tanking. As a result, the current research collects data from the social media platform 
Twitter to quantify consumer perceptions of tanking. Considering the possible long-term 
effect of perceived tanking behavior on demand for sport, this dissertation also uses 
Twitter data to construct variables measuring the past consumer perceptions of tanking 
and examines their relationships with NBA attendance in the current season. Taken 
together, this dissertation proposes the following four research questions: 
RQ1: How do consumer perceptions of tanking for home teams affect NBA 
attendance in the short term? 
RQ2: How do consumer perceptions of tanking for home teams affect NBA 
attendance in the long term? 
RQ3: How do consumer perceptions of tanking for visiting teams affect NBA 
attendance in the short term? 
RQ4: How do consumer perceptions of tanking for visiting teams affect NBA 





3.1 OVERVIEW  
Following the prior empirical examinations of demand for sport, this dissertation 
employs a panel dataset to investigate the relationship between consumer perceptions of 
tanking and NBA attendance. The panel data consists of 29 of the 30 NBA teams and all 
regular season games played between the 2013-2014 and 2017-2018 NBA seasons. The 
Toronto Raptors are not included in the dataset due to their location in Canada and the 
differences between how federal governments calculate economic variables such as 
population. In addition to gathering team and game data, social media platform Twitter is 
employed to gauge consumer perceptions of tanking. 
Twitter data is selected to quantify consumer perceptions of tanking for several 
reasons. First, while other popular social media platforms such as Facebook and 
Instagram are available, the underlying function of Twitter is different from others 
(Waterloo, Baumgartner, Peter, & Valkenburg, 2018). In particular, Twitter emphasizes 
the function of sharing ideas and topics, whereas Facebook highlights the ability to 
connect people and Instagram underlies the capability of sharing photos with friends 
(Davenport, Bergman, Bergman, & Fearrington, 2014; Van Dijck & Poell, 2013; 
Watanabe et al., 2016). Given this observation, it is believed that Twitter is the platform 
where users will express strong feelings and emotions toward tanking. Thus, Twitter may 
be considered as a better channel to measure perceptions of tanking than other social 
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media websites. Second, Twitter has gained significant popularity since 2011. It was 
reported that Twitter had 140 million daily users by 2012 (Kywe, Lim, & Zhu, 2012). 
Hence, there exists a large quantity of data on Twitter that can be analyzed to understand 
consumer options and feelings toward tanking (Vicente, Batista, & Carvalho, 2019).  
The first section of this chapter describes key variables used in the data analysis, 
including the two variables of interest measuring consumer perceptions of tanking and a 
set of control variables. The next section presents detailed steps of acquiring Twitter data 
and constructing the variables of interest. The last section discusses model specifications 
and estimation methods used in data analysis. 
3.2 DATA DESCRIPTIONS 
3.2.1 UNIT OF ANALYSIS AND POPULATION 
The current dissertation analyzes game-level NBA attendance data from the 2013-
2014 to 2017-2018 seasons. Using game-level data can explain more variances of game 
attendance than aggregated season-level data (Bradbury & Drinen, 2006). In general, 
NBA teams play 41 home and 41 away regular-season games in a given season. Thus, 
there are 5,945 unique regular season NBA games from 29 NBA teams across five 
seasons available to examine. However, subsets of games are used in different models 
depending on the focus of research questions. For instance, for models exploring the 
short-term effect of perceptions of tanking for home teams on attendance, 2,870 games 
featuring non-playoff teams at home in a given are used. For analysis studying the impact 
of perceptions of tanking for home teams on attendance in the long term, 2,829 matches 
featuring home teams that did not qualify for the playoffs in the prior season are 
identified. In addition, 2,769 and 2,774 NBA games are respectively investigated in 
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models analyzing the impact of perceptions of tanking for visiting teams on NBA 
attendance in the short and long run. The reason to consider only non-playoff teams in 
various models is due to the fact that playoff teams often undertake tanking for reasons 
other than competing for higher draft picks. For example, teams after clinching the 
playoff berth may begin to purposely lose games in order to gain better playoff seeds or 
saving energy for the playoffs (Balsdon et al, 2007). However, neither of these behaviors 
relates to the focus of the current dissertation, which is to examine the behavior of teams 
purposely losing games to acquire high draft picks. Therefore, to accurately capture how 
consumers perceive teams tanking for draft picks, only games involving non-playoff 
teams are considered. 
The population in the current dissertation consists of 29 NBA teams. The Toronto 
Raptors are excluded due to their geographic location in Canada. Additionally, the 
rebranding of the Charlotte Bobcats after the 2013-2014 season needs special attention. 
The Charlotte Bobcats joined the NBA in 2004 as an expansion team and used the 
nickname Bobcats until 2014 when team owners decided to rebrand the franchise from 
the Charlotte Bobcats to Charlotte Hornets which was the original name for a franchise in 
the city from 1988 to 2002 prior to the franchise moving to New Orleans. While the team 
adopted a new team name and logo upon the conclusion of the 2013-2014 season, the 
ownership and physical location of the franchise remained the same. For this reason, the 






To examine the effect of perceptions of tanking on NBA attendance, a set of 
variables is employed in econometric models (Table 3.1). The summary statistics can be 
found in Table 3.2. The dependent variable, game attendance (Attendance), for NBA 
matches played from the 2013-2014 through 2017-2018 regular seasons is collected from 
basketball-reference.com. While attendance is an effective measure of consumer demand 
for sporting events, it is important to note that the reported game attendance reflects the 
number of tickets sold, not the actual number of fans attended NBA games. In some cases, 
fans may buy tickets but decide not to attend matches for some reason (Forrest  & 
Simmons, 2002). As such, the actual attendance may be slightly lower than the reported 
one. The average attendance for games included in this dissertation is 17,734 per game 
and 45.8% of games are sold out. 
Moving to the independent variables, the two variables of interest, the volume and 
sentiment of tanking tweets, are created to approximate perceptions of tanking. The 
volume of tanking tweets reflects consumer awareness of tanking and is measured by the 
quantity of tanking tweets posted over a certain period of time. The increasing discussion 
of tanking on Twitter may signify that people become more aware of the concept of 
tanking (Hutter, HautzDennhardt, & Füller, 2013). The sentiment of tanking tweets 
represents consumer sentiments (i.e., positive, negative, and neutral) toward tanking. If 
fans consider tanking as a viable strategy, then positive sentiments are likely to be 
detected on Twitter. However, Twitter users may express disappointment or 
dissatisfaction if they dislike the idea of tanking. Furthermore, if people feel indifferent to 
tanking, neutral sentiments shall be observed on Twitter. 
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To address four research questions proposed in Section 2.5, the two variables of 
interest are constructed based on two timeframes, the short term and long term. First, the 
short-term variables calculate the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets posted within 
31 days before the tipoff of an NBA game.1 It is likely that consumer perceptions of 
tanking formed prior to an NBA match will affect fans’ decisions to buy tickets. 
Therefore, the short-term variables are used to quantify how fans perceive tanking 
behavior approaching an NBA game. Second, the long-term variables estimate the 
volume and sentiment of tanking tweets posted from the previous season2 (July 1 as the 
season cutoff3). These lagged variables are created in an attempt to examine whether the 
past consumer perceptions of tanking affect attendance decisions in the current season. 
When constructing the two variables of interest, the volume and sentiment of 
tanking tweets for home teams and visiting teams are also differentiated. It is likely that 
local fans who intend to attend NBA games do not only consider tanking behavior for 
home teams but also for visiting teams. In other words, consumer perceptions of tanking 
related to both home and away teams can potentially affect attendance decisions. 
Therefore, the two variables of interest for opponents are also added in this dissertation. 
In sum, a total of eight variables measuring consumer perceptions of tanking are 
                                                 
1 31 days is chosen as the timespan for short-term variables. Other timespans such as 15 
days, 62 days, and 93 days will be used in the robustness checks. 
2 The previous season is chosen as the timespan for long-term variables. Other timespans 
such as the entire regular season will be used in the robustness check. 
3 July 1st is chosen as the cutoff between the current NBA season and the previous NBA 
season because the NBA considers July 1st as the beginning of a new fiscal year. 
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examined in this dissertation (Short_Volume_Home, Short_Sentiment_Home, 
Long_Volume_Home, Long_Sentimnet_Home, Short_Volume_Away, 
Short_Sentiment_Away, Long_Volume_Away, Long_Sentiment_Away). 
The demand for sport literature also documents a range of control variables that 
may affect attendance decisions. These control variables include economic factors, the 
quality of viewing, and the quality of sporting contests as summarized by Borland and 
MacDonald (2003). For economic factors, the first variable concerns the Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) population (Population), which is a proxy for the market size of 
the city where an NBA team locates. A range of empirical studies shown that more 
populated regions would experience higher demand for sporting contests (Noll, 1974). 
The MSA population data is drawn from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis website. 
The second economic factor, namely, Coincident Indexes (Coincident_Index) is a 
continuous variable, measuring monthly economic conditions in the state where an NBA 
team resides (Oga, 1998). Previous research revealed that people living in wealthier areas 
tended to have higher demand for games if sporting events were considered as normal 
goods (Carson, Cenesizoglu, & Parker, 2011; Hansen & Gauthier, 1989). Coincident 
Index data is retrieved from the Philadelphiafed.org website. Demand for attendance also 
depends on pressure from competitors (Rascher et al., 2009). Fierce competition for the 
same market may lead to low demand for certain individual sports teams and leagues 
(Winfree & Fort, 2008). To account for this competition, a continuous variable counting 
the number of teams from other professional sports leagues (Competition) sharing the 
same market is considered. This data is acquired from sports-reference.com. 
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One aspect of the quality of viewing concerns the condition of the sports facilities. 
For instance, facility age (Facility_Age) can affect consumer experience at sporting 
events, and thus determines demand for sport. Previous research showed a convex 
relationship between facility age and game attendance (Coates & Humphreys, 2005). 
That is, attendance seems higher in the early years of the operation of sport facilities and 
begins to decrease over time. However, attendance may surge again in later years of the 
facility’s lifespan. As such, a quadratic term for facility age is added into models 
(Facility_Age2). Facility age data is retrieved from NBA media guides. 
Another aspect of the quality of viewing is the timing of sporting events, which 
plays a crucial role in determining consumer demand for sport (Schofield, 1983). Time-
related dummy variables, such as holidays (Holiday), the day of a week (Day), the month 
of a year (October, November, December, January, February, March, and April), and 
NBA seasons are employed in statistical models (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989). Following 
previous studies on demand for sport, the following holidays are used: Christmas Day, 
Memorial Day, Labor Day, Independence Day, New Years’ Day, Thanksgiving Day, and 
Martin Luther King Day (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989). It is commonly assumed that teams 
face higher demand for sporting events on holidays and weekends where fans have more 
time to attend or watch games. 
Turning to variables measuring the quality of sporting contests, it is well 
documented that team quality and game uncertainty are vital determinants of demand for 
attendance. In this dissertation, Elo ratings created by FiveThirtyEight.com are employed 
to measure team strength. Compared with other measures of team quality such as the 
winning percentage, Elo ratings account for more performance information, and thus may 
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be regarded as a better measure of team quality. For instance, the calculation of the Elo 
ratings does not only consider current win-loss records, but also the expectation of game 
outcomes (Mills et al., 2016). Such consideration provides a more objective assessment 
of team quality than other scales (Silver & Fischer-Baum, 2015). The average Elo rating 
for NBA teams is 1,500. The score increases when teams win games and declines when 
they lose games over the course of the season. The Elo rating system is a particularly 
useful metric at the beginning of the season (Mills et al., 2016). In contrast to the winning 
percentage that may not truly reflect team quality when teams only play a few games, Elo 
ratings incorporate team performance from the previous season in calculating the Elo 
rating for the current season, and thus may better reflect team success than other metrics 
in the early of the season (Silver & Fischer-Baum, 2015). In this dissertation, both home 
and visiting team Elo rating variables (Elo_Home, Elo_Away) are included. A handful of 
studies offered evidence that home and visiting teams’ quality were positively linked to 
fan interest in attending sporting events (Cairns et al., 1986; Humphreys & Johnson, 2020; 
Leadley & Zygmont, 2005). 
Point spreads collected from betting markets are used to quantify game 
uncertainty (Soebbing & Humphreys, 2013). The closing point spread (Point_Spread) is 
a continuous variable, estimating the score difference between two competing teams in a 
given match. For instance, bookmakers set the following point spreads in the game 






Atlanta Hawks             -4 
 
In this example, the negative sign of point spread indicates that the Atlanta Hawks were a 
four-point favorite to win the game. If the Hawks eventually win by more than four 
points, then gamblers who bet that win the wager. The point spread is considered as a 
better estimator of the team quality gap than other measures such as the absolute 
difference between the home and away team winning percentage, as bookmakers who 
rely on setting point spreads to make profits have strong motivations to make accurate 
predictions (Forrest et al., 2005). Considering a probable curvilinear relationship between 
game uncertainty and attendance, a quadratic term of the point spread variable is also 
added in models (Point_Spread2; Coates et al., 2014). Point spread data is retrieved from 
Goldsheet.com, a website offering betting odds for varying types of sports competitions.  
3.3 DATA COLLECTION 
The previous section noted that Twitter data was used to construct the two 
variables of interest, the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets. This section offers 
more details regarding the procedure of creating these two variables. The first part of this 
section delineates specific steps taken to acquire and clean Twitter data. The second part 
concerns the process of using Twitter data to build the two variables of interest. 
3.3.2 TWITTER DATA COLLECTION 
Both tanking tweets and NBA team tweets are needed in order to calculate the 
volume and sentiment of tanking tweets. First, to search for tanking tweets for individual 
NBA teams, the keywords ‘tanking’ and the NBA team nickname(s) such as ‘Lakers’ are 
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used in the Twitter Application Programming Interface (API), an access point where 
users retrieve Twitter posts. It is critical to note that the reason that NBA team nicknames 
are chosen here as search terms is that these words can produce a more complete list of 
tanking tweets, than full NBA team names such as the ‘Los Angeles Lakers’. All NBA 
team nicknames used are listed in Table 3.3. Among these names, the Philadelphia Sixers’ 
nickname can be refereed as either ‘Sixers’ or ‘76ers’. Thus, both ‘Sixers’ and ‘76ers’ are 
searched in gathering tanking tweets. Also, the keyword ‘tanking’ has to be used with 
caution. While ‘tanking’ may not be the sole word to describe the behavior of teams 
purposely losing games, other search terms such as ‘rebuilding’ generated a considerable 
amount of irrelevant results. For this reason, this dissertation only employs ‘tanking’ as 
the search term in collecting tanking tweets. 
In addition to drawing tanking tweets from the Twitter API, NBA team tweets 
measuring the popularity of NBA franchises are acquired. The purpose of retrieving team 
tweets lies in the possibility that the number of tanking tweets may not fully reflect the 
intensity of tanking discussions on Twitter. For instance, big market teams such as the 
Los Angeles Lakers and New York Knicks may have bigger fan base than small market 
teams. Consequently, more tanking discussions related to big market teams tend to appear 
on Twitter. However, the absolute quantity of tanking tweets pertaining to big market 
teams does not effectively quantify the intensity of tanking discussions, which intends to 
measure how well fans are aware of the idea of tanking. The number of team tweets 
posted on Twitter signals the general popularity of NBA teams, and thus can be used to 
normalize tanking tweets in order to better measure the intensity of tanking discussions. 
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Similar to the process of retrieving tanking tweets, I collect NBA team tweets 
through the Twitter API. However, a different set of search keywords are used. 
Specifically, I use the keywords ‘#NBA’ and the hashtag with an NBA team nickname 
such as ‘#Lakers’ to collect team tweets. Considering computer processing time and the 
possible millions of tweets for each team, this combination of keywords can return 
sufficient number of tweets to represent team popularity. 
In sum, a total of 166,875 tanking tweets and 6,389,698 NBA team tweets posted 
between July 1, 2012, to June 30, 2018, are collected. The downloaded Twitter data 
contains a few pieces of information. As shown in Table 3.4, each tweet contains a 
unique Twitter ID, publication date, tweet text, the number of retweets, and related NBA 
team names. However, after a careful examination of Twitter data, it seems that several 
search results are not correctly identified. For instance, with the search terms ‘warriors’ 
and ‘tanking’, a list of tanking tweets related to the video game World of Warcraft 
emerged in search results (See Table 3.4). To ensure the quality of tanking tweets, I took 
a few steps to tease out irrelevant tanking tweets from the downloaded dataset. 
The procedure of removing unrelated tanking tweets is drawn in Figure 3.3. 
Overall, Natural Language Processing (NLP) combined with machine learning models is 
implemented to eliminate irrelevant tweets based on the analysis of tweet content. The 
raw tweets containing noisy information cannot be directly used in machine learning 
models. Thus, a series of steps is performed here to process raw tweets (Figure 3.1). The 
first step concerns data cleaning. Specifically, special symbols and characters including 
hashtags, punctuations, digits, URLs, ‘@’, NBA team city names, NBA team nicknames, 
are removed from tweets. Also, all capital letters in tweets are transformed into lowercase 
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letters. The second step involves tokenization, which functions to split sentences into 
individual words. The third step aims to remove all stop words such as ‘the’ and ‘a’ that 
are commonly used in sentences but not useful in understanding tweet content. The fourth 
step is stemming and lemmatization, which intends to convert words into their base form. 
For instance, lemmatization transforms words such as ‘saw’ to the base form ‘see’ and 
stemming removes the derivational affixes in a word. 
Next, feature extraction converting terms in a document into features that can be 
used in machine learning models is employed. In this step, I adopted the n-gram model 
with a unigram. In essence, the n-gram model is used to count the frequency of n 
consecutive words in a given text. The word frequency is then treated as features in 
machine learning models. For instance, a unigram employed in this model only considers 
individual words in a text, while a bigram examines the sequence of two consecutive 
words (See examples in Figure 3.2). 
After raw tweets are cleaned and feature extraction is completed, a random 
sample of 5,000 tweets are selected from the dataset and manually labeled by a coder 
with one of the classes 1 and 0, with 1 meaning the tweet relates to the NBA and 0 
indicating it does not. Next, the labeled tweets are fitted into several machine learning 
models. After comparing the prediction performance across all models, the best 
performing model is chosen to estimate the class in all remaining tweets. In this case, I 
select the XGBoost algorithm that yields 98.8% accuracy in predicting the class of 
tanking tweets. 
  In sum, of the original 166,875 tanking tweets collected through the Twitter API, 
I removed 5,173 irrelevant tweets based on the predication of the XGBoost models. As 
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such, a total of 161,702 tanking tweets are used in this dissertation. With cleaned Twitter 
data, I proceed to construct the two variables of interest, the volume and sentiment of 
tanking tweets that are used to approximate consumer perceptions of tanking. 
3.3.3 VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
While the Twitter posts gathered in the previous steps contained tweet publication 
date and text, neither could be directly used in econometric models. Thus, an additional 
step is needed to transform the Twitter data into a useful variable that can be applied in 
statistical models. In this section, I describe the detailed steps taken to construct the two 
variables of interest, the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets. 
To begin with, the volume of tanking tweets concerns the number of tanking 
tweets posted within a certain period of time, adjusted for team tweets. Specifically, the 
short-term volume variables count the number of tanking tweets posted within 31 days 
before an NBA contest, divided by the quantity of team tweets published in the same 
period. Here, the calculation of the volume variables takes team tweets into consideration 
for normalization. As noted before, big market teams tend to draw more attention on 
social media than small market teams. Hence, the absolute quantity of tanking tweets 
may not truly reflect the intensity of tanking discussions on Twitter. Similarly, the long-
term volume variable calculates the quantity of all tanking tweets published from the 
previous NBA season, adjusted for team tweets. It is critical to note that the number of 
retweets is also considered in computing volume variables. For instance, if a tanking 
tweet is retweeted 10 times, then 11, including 10 retweets and the tweet itself, will be 
added into the calculation of the volume variables.  
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The second variable of interest, the sentiment of tanking tweets, concerns the 
average sentiment expressed in tanking tweets. To extract sentiments from tweets, 
sentiment analysis is conducted. Sentiment analysis is the process of understanding 
people’s opinions and feelings by analyzing textual data (Kumar & Jaiswal, 2020). 
Recently, a significant portion of sentiment analysis focuses on detecting valance on the 
positive-negative scale (Farhadloo & Rolland, 2013). That is, one of the three sentiment 
classes, positive, neutral, and negative is often assigned to entities based on the analysis 
of textual data. 
The field of sentiment analysis has developed a range of methods to identify 
opinions and feelings in text messages (Feldma, 2013). As noted in the literature review 
section, perhaps the most popular sentiment analysis approach adopted in sport 
management research is the lexicon-based method, which estimates the sentiment of a 
document by using a pre-defined dictionary of positive and negative words and counting 
the quantify of net positive words. 
The present dissertation utilizes machine learning models to perform sentiment 
analysis. A range of advantages of using machine learning methods to perform sentiment 
analysis have to be noted. First, machine learning models can automatically extract 
sentiments from textual data with good accuracy (Neethu & Rajasree, 2013). This merit 
is particularly useful in processing a large dataset such as social media posts where 
thousands or even millions of data points may exist. With the increasing popularity of 
social media, the sheer number of messages posted on social media platforms everyday is 
growing faster than ever (Witkemper, Lim, & Waldburger, 2012). In the meantime, social 
media posts contain valuable information regarding consumer sentiment, which is useful 
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data in understanding behavior (Watanabe et al., 2016). Compared with other measures 
of consumer sentiment such as surveys, using machine learning methods can quickly 
detect sentiments in a large set of social media data, and thus may better help capture 
emotions from customers (Aydoğan & Akcayol, 2016). 
Second, machine learning methods take the context into consideration when 
attempting to estimate sentiments (Pang & Lee, 2004). Unlike the lexicon-based 
approach, the machine learning method does not rely on a pre-defined dictionary. Instead, 
a training set that consists of a randomly selected sample from the entire dataset with 
manually labeled sentiments is used. This merit is especially important for sports research 
as certain words may have special meanings in the context of sport. For instance, 
previous sentiment analysis of Twitter posts using the lexicon-based method labeled the 
following sentience with the sentiment disgust, ‘NFL is sick but I have no idea what's 
happening’ (Chang, 2019). The literal interpretation of the word ‘sick’ might regard the 
sentence as the expression of disgust. However, considering the context of sport, the 
author of this post seemed to show affection for the NFL, rather than disgust. As such, 
machine learning methods relying on statistical models rather than pre-defined 
dictionaries may better measure sentiments in social media posts under various contexts. 
The detailed steps of conducting sentiment analysis using machine learning 
models are listed in Figure 3.3. The first step, data pre-processing, and the second step, 
feature extraction, are the same as the previous work of removing irrelevant tanking 
tweets, except that I employ the n-gram model with both unigram and bigram, not just 
unigram as in the previous work. 
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After raw tweets are cleaned and feature extraction is completed, the random 
sample of 5,000 tweets selected in the prior work of filtering out unrelated tanking tweets 
are manually labeled by coders with one of the sentiment classes, positive (1), negative (-
1), and neutral (0) (See Table 3.4).  
Next, the labeled tweets are fitted into machine learning models. 
Methodologically, sentiment analysis resembles a multiclass classification problem 
where models were trained to predict sentiments in new tweets. After comparing the 
prediction performance across all models, the best performance model is selected to 
estimate sentiment in all remaining tweets. For this sentiment analysis, I choose the 
Linear Support-Vector Machine algorithm (LSVM) that yields 70.1% accuracy in 
predicting sentiments in tanking tweets. In general, 70% prediction accuracy is 
considered as a benchmark for successful sentiment analysis (Kirilenko, Stepchenkova, 
Kim, & Li, 2018). 
After identifying sentiments in all tweets, the next step is to construct the 
sentiment variables. This variable is derived by calculating the average sentiment from 
tweets posted within a certain period of time. The formula for calculating the sentiment 
of tanking tweets is shown below:  
 
 =  	 




          (1) 
where S denotes the sentiment value, 1, -1, and 0; i indicates three sentiment categories, 
positive, negative, and neutral; P(S) measures the percentage of each type of sentiments 
in the sample tweets. It is important to note that P(S) accounts for the number of retweets. 
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For instance, if there are two tweets with one being labeled as negative and the other one 
being labeled as positive and have three retweets, then the average sentiment will be 0.6, 
not 0. 
In sum, the value of the sentiment of tanking tweets spans from -1 to 1, with -1 
indicating all discussions on Twitter are negative toward tanking and 1 implying that all 
discussions on Twitter exhibit positive sentiments toward tanking. Furthermore, similar 
to the volume of tanking tweets, both short-term and long-term sentiment of tanking 
tweets are derived. The short-term sentiment variable estimates the average sentiment of 
Twitter posts published within 31 days before an NBA match, while the long-term 
sentiment variable calculates the average sentiment of all tanking tweets posted from the 
prior season. 
3.4 MODEL SPECIFICATIONS  
Based on the literature review and collected Twitter data, the following 
econometric models are employed to evaluate the relationship between perceptions of 
tanking and NBA attendance. The equation (2) below shows that the dependent variable, 
the natural log of game-level NBA attendance (Attendance), is a function of a vector of 
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    (2) 
where i represents teams in season t at game g. βs represent estimators for variables. 6 is 
unobserved time effects and 7 is team-specific effects. 8 is the error term. 
To estimate parameters in econometric models, this dissertation adopts a censored 
normal regression model (Humphreys & Johnson, 2020). Due to the overwhelming 
number of sell-out games in the NBA, most NBA attendance data is censored at the 
capacity level (Coates & Humphreys, 2005). The data analysis shows that 45.8% of NBA 
games in the sample were sold out. If the model would be estimated using the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression, the estimators may be biased and inconsistent 
(Wooldridge, 2010). To overcome such an issue, the censored normal regression model 
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where c is the facility capacity. In some cases, the reported game attendance exceeds the 
arena capacity. Over-selling can emerge when NBA teams sell additional standing room 
tickets or temporarily expand the capacity of luxury boxes (Coates & Humphreys, 2005). 
Nevertheless, attendance is treated as censored data if the reported attendance is larger 
than capacity (Buraimo & Simmons, 2008). If attendance is smaller than capacity, the 
actual attendance was observed at the level of Attendance*.   
The model also adds team and season fixed effects to account for unobserved 
factors that can affect demand for sport. Despite concerns that non-linear regression 
models with fixed effects may produce inconsistent estimators due to the incidental 
parameters problem (Lancaster, 2000; Neyman & Scott, 1948), Greene (2004) conducted 
the Monte Carlo simulation and noted that estimators from the censored normal 
regression model with fixed effects were consistent. 
Additionally, the unobserved error term in econometric models may be serially 
correlated with one another within clusters (teams). To address this serial correlation 
concern and derive efficient estimators, cluster-robust standard errors are calculated 
(Woodridge, 2010). 
In summary, a total of seven models are estimated and compared. The first model 
attempts to reveal the general relationship between consumer perceptions of tanking and 
game attendance by employing the entire dataset of 5,945 NBA matches. As noted before, 
to ensure Twitter data measuring consumer perceptions of tanking is related to the 
behavior of teams deliberately losing games for draft picks, not for other purposes, NBA 
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games featuring non-playoff teams which have incentives to tank for draft picks are 
considered in other main models. 
The second main model addresses the first research question that explores the 
connection between perceptions of tanking for home teams and demand for sport in the 
short term. Specifically, 2,870 games featuring home teams that are not eligible for the 
playoffs in the observed season are examined in the second model. The third model 
focuses on studying the long-term effect of consumer perceptions of tanking for home 
teams on attendance. To do this, 2,829 matches involving home teams that did not 
compete in the playoffs in the prior season are considered. The fourth model is tested in 
an attempt to answer the third reason question whether consumer perceptions of tanking 
for visiting teams will affect attendance in the short term. As such, 2,769 games featuring 
away teams that do not enter the playoffs in the observed season are analyzed. The fifth 
model investigates the long-term impact of consumer perceptions of tanking for away 
teams on attendance. Here, 2,774 matches featuring visiting teams that do not compete in 
the playoffs in the previous season are selected to test the relationship. The last two 
models perform falsification tests by adding the variables gauging the future volume and 
sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams and away teams respectively. Falsification 
tests aim to examine whether an unlikely event is statistically significant in models. In 
this case, if models are correctly specified, the future volume and sentiment of tanking 
tweets should not impact NBA attendance. 
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Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Description 
Attendance Number of tickets sold in a game 
Short_Volume_Home Short-term (31 days before games) volume of tanking tweets for home teams 
Short_Sentiment_Home Short-term (31 days before games) sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams 
Long_Volume_Home Long-term (Prior season) volume of tanking tweets for home teams 
Long_Sentiment_Home Long-term (Prior season) sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams 
Short_Volume_Away Short-term (31 days before games) volume of tanking tweets for away teams  
Short_Sentiment_Away Short-term (31 days before games) sentiment of tanking tweets for away teams  
Long_Volume_Away Long-term (Prior season) volume of tanking tweets for away teams 
Long_Sentiment_Away Long-term (Prior season) sentiment of tanking tweets for away teams 
Future_Volume_Home Future (31 days after games) volume of tanking tweets for home teams 
Future_Sentiment_Home Future (31 days after games) sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams 
Future_Volume_Away Future (31 days after games) volume of tanking tweets for away teams 
Future_Sentiment_Away Future (31 days after games) sentiment of tanking tweets for away teams 
Facility_Age Age of sports facilities (in years) 
Facility_Age2 Age of sports facilities Squared (in years) 
Point_Spread Expected score differences between two competing teams 
Point_Spread2 Expected score differences between two competing teams Squared 
Elo_Home Elo ratings for home teams 
Elo_Away Elo ratings for away teams 
Population Population of city (in ten thousands) 
Coincident_Index Monthly coincident index for each of the 50 states 
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Competition Number of MLB, NFL, and NHL teams in the same market as a NBA team 
Holiday Games held on National holidays (1=yes) 
Monday Games held on Monday (1=yes) 
Tuesday Games held on Tuesday (1=yes) 
Wednesday Games held on Wednesday (1=yes) 
Thursday Games held on Thursday (1=yes) 
Friday Games held on Friday (1=yes) 
Saturday Games held on Saturday (1=yes) 
Sunday Games held on Sunday (1=yes) 
October Games held in October (1=yes) 
November Games held in November (1=yes) 
December Games held in December (1=yes) 
January Games held in January (1=yes) 
February Games held in February (1=yes) 
March Games held in March (1=yes) 
April Games held in April (1=yes) 
2014 Games held in the 2013-2014 NBA season (1=yes) 
2015 Games held in the 2014-2015 NBA season (1=yes) 
2016 Games held in the 2015-2016 NBA season (1=yes) 
2017 Games held in the 2016-2017 NBA season (1=yes) 
2018 Games held in the 2017-2018 NBA season (1=yes) 
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Table 3.2 Summary Statistics (n= 5945) 
 
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Attendance 17,733.5 2,294.8 7,244 23,152 
Short_Volume_Home 0.074 0.183 0.000 2.755 
Short_Sentiment_Home -0.628 0.264 -1.000 1.000 
Long_Volume_Home 0.042 0.079 0.0002 0.597 
Long_Sentiment_Home -0.674 0.115 -0.909 -0.197 
Short_Volume_Away 0.072 0.176 0.000 2.685 
Short_Sentiment_Away -0.629 0.265 -1.000 1.000 
Long_Volume_Away 0.041 0.078 0.0002 0.597 
Long_Sentiment_Away -0.673 0.116 -0.909 -0.197 
Future_Volume_Home 0.081 0.180 0.000 2.582 
Future_Sentiment_Home -0.632 0.247 -1.000 1.000 
Future_Volume_Away 0.082 0.184 0.000 2.429 
Future_Sentiment_Away -0.627 0.256 -1.000 1.000 
Facility_Age 19.8 10.1 1 52 
Point_Spread 1.7 7.0 -18.5 21.0 
Elo_Home 1,502.8 112.4 1,174.7 1,835.7 
Elo_Away 1,504.5 111.6 1,175.5 1,838.6 
Population 55.6 50.8 5.3 203.2 
Coincident_Index 120.5 9.6 98.3 144.8 
Competition 2.2 1.9 0 7 
Holiday 0.016 0.125 0 1 
Monday 0.14 0.347 0 1 
Tuesday 0.117 0.321 0 1 
Wednesday 0.205 0.404 0 1 
Thursday 0.075 0.264 0 1 
Friday 0.191 0.393 0 1 
Saturday 0.15 0.357 0 1 
Sunday 0.121 0.326 0 1 
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October 0.038 0.191 0 1 
November 0.181 0.385 0 1 
December 0.185 0.388 0 1 
January 0.184 0.387 0 1 
February 0.136 0.342 0 1 
March 0.191 0.393 0 1 
April 0.085 0.28 0 1 
2014 0.2 0.4 0 1 
2015 0.2 0.4 0 1 
2016 0.2 0.4 0 1 
2017 0.2 0.4 0 1 
2018 0.2 0.4 0 1 
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Table 3.3 NBA Team Search Keywords 
 
Number NBA Franchises Search Keywords (Nicknames) 
1 Atlanta Hawks Hawks 
2 Boston Celtics Celtics 
3 Brooklyn Nets Nets 
4 Charlotte Hornets (2014-2015 – Present) Hornets 
 Charlotte Bobcats (Before 2013-2014) Bobcats 
5 Chicago Bulls Bulls 
6 Cleveland Cavaliers Cavaliers 
7 Dallas Mavericks Mavericks 
8 Denver Nuggets Nuggets 
9 Detroit Pistons Pistons 
10 Golden State Warriors Warriors 
11 Houston Rockets Rockets 
12 Indiana Pacers Pacers 
13 Los Angeles Clippers Clippers 
14 Los Angeles Lakers Lakers 
15 Memphis Grizzlies Grizzlies 
16 Miami Heat Heat 
17 Milwaukee Bucks Bucks 
18 Minnesota Timberwolves Timberwolves 
19 New Orleans Pelicans Pelicans 
20 New York Knicks Knicks 
21 Oklahoma City Thunder Thunder 
22 Orlando Magic Magic 
23 Philadelphia 76ers 76ers and Sixers 
24 Phoenix Suns Suns 
25 Portland Trail Blazers Blazers 
26 Sacramento Kings Kings 
27 San Antonio Spurs Spurs 
28 Utah Jazz Jazz 




Table 3.4 Tanking Tweet Samples 
 
Twitter ID Date Text Retweet Team Class Sentiment 
xxxx 7872 2013-03-06 Whether by design or through incompetence (more 
likely) I love that @Sixers are tanking! #SixersTalk 
#SixersNation #Sixers @SixersCEOAdam" 
0 Sixers 1 Positive (1) 
xxxx 5472 2016-01-26 I hate to admit it as a diehard laker fan but @Lakers I 
know your tanking. I hate it cause its not within our 
blood. I'll never support it 
2 Lakers 1 Negative (-1) 
xxxx 3424 2013-07-08 @JakeJ29 @zero_chill I'm fine with tanking.  But we 
wont be top 5 worst teams either. We wont land 
Wiggins or Glen Robinson III.  #Bucks 
0 Bucks 1 Neutral (0) 
xxxx 0672 2014-06-17 @Celestalon if protection warriors get a talent to 
make then DPS can there be a talent to make Frost 
DKs tank again I loved tanking frost 




















Chapter 4 describes the data analysis results. The first section of this chapter 
provides a detailed summary of the two variables of interest, the volume and sentiment of 
tanking tweets, which are derived from Twitter data. It is critical to note that the 
summary only includes non-playoff teams as they have incentives to tank for draft picks, 
while other teams do not. With the current dissertation focusing on examining the 
behavior of teams deliberately losing games for draft picks, attention is therefore placed 
on non-playoff teams. The second section of this chapter reports regression analysis 
results, along with robustness checks that test the strength of estimation results. 
4.1 SUMMARY OF TWITTER DATA 
4.1.1 VOLUME OF TANKING TWEETS 
The volume of tanking tweets reflects the fans’ awareness of tanking and is 
calculated by using the number of tanking tweets divided by the quantity of team tweets. 
Here, I summarize the volume of tanking tweets at the game, team, month, and season 
levels. First, in the Twitter dataset spanning from the 2013-2014 to 2017-18 NBA 
seasons, the highest short-term volume of tanking tweets for an individual game was the 
Chicago Bulls on March 23, 2018 when they played against the Milwaukee Bucks at 
home. Such extensive discussion of tanking could be attributed to the player rest strategy 
that the Bulls had adopted since the beginning of February that year. In particular, the 
Bulls rested Robin Lopez and Justin Holiday, both of whom were starters for the team 
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and had a significant amount of playing time before being requested to sit out (NBA, 
2018). The NBA subsequently issued a warning to the Bulls on March 6, stating that their 
behavior violates the league player rest policy (NBA, 2018). The warning caused strong 
speculation among fans that the Bulls rested healthy players in order to tank for draft 
picks. As such, it was not surprising that the high volume of tanking tweets appeared 
prior to the Bulls’ game on March 23. 
At the team level, the 2014-2015 Philadelphia Sixers had the highest volume of 
tanking tweets among all team-season observations. With the hiring of Sam Hinkie, an 
advocate of using tanking to rebuild NBA franchises, on May 10, 2013 as the General 
Manager (ESPN, 2013), the Sixers implemented a tanking strategy (Hinkie, 2016). After 
only 18 wins out of 82 games played in the 2014-2015 NBA season, it was not surprising 
to see fans raise strong concerns that the Sixers were tanking. The second highest volume 
of tanking tweets at the team-season level was the previous Sixers’ season (2013-2014). 
This season was the Sixers’ first season under the leadership of Sam Hinkie. It appeared 
that a large quantity of tanking discussions related to the Sixers posted on Twitter 
throughout the entire 2013-2014 season. The ten highest season volume of tanking tweets 
and corresponding teams and seasons are listed in Table 4.1. Figure 4.1 plots the short-
term volume of tanking tweets for the Sixers with Locally Estimated Scatterplot 
Smoothing (LOESS) that shows a general trend of volume over the sample period. Plots 
for other teams are available upon request. 
At the season level, the 2013-2014 NBA season experienced a significant increase 
of tanking discussions on Twitter. The volume of tanking posts on Twitter seemed to 
progressively decline in the following seasons. However, tanking discussions spiked 
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again in the 2017-2018 NBA season. As Figure 4.2 showes, the volume of tanking tweets 
in the 2013-2014 and 2017-2018 NBA seasons were considerably higher than other 
seasons. Notably, the 2013-2014 NBA season marked the first season when Sam Hinkie 
became the general manager of the Sixers and planned to undertake the extreme tanking 
strategy by deliberately losing numerous games in consecutive seasons (Paxton, 2018). 
The 2017-2018 season was surrounded by several tanking-related incidents that caused 
the extensive discussion of tanking on Twitter. For example, in addition to the warning 
issued to the Bulls regarding resting healthy players, the NBA league office fined the 
Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban $600,000 for publicly admitting tanking during the 
2017-2018 NBA season (NBA, 2018). 
Additionally, the volume of tanking tweets varies from month to month during the 
NBA regular season. Figure 4.3 summarizes and plots the volume of tanking tweets by 
month. It seems the volume of tanking tweets is exceedingly higher in February and 
March than other months during the NBA regular season. These findings are not 
surprising, given the fact that NBA teams are more likely to deliberately lose games 
toward the end of the NBA season, especially when they are eliminated from playoff 
contention (Price et al, 2010; Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). 
4.1.2 SENTIMENT OF TANKING TWEETS 
The second variable of interest, the sentiment of tanking tweets, measures 
consumer attitudes toward tanking and is estimated by the average sentiment expressed in 
tanking tweets. Recall that sentiment analysis is performed to extract sentiments from 
tanking tweets. Specifically, each tweet is assigned with one of the classes, negative (-1), 
neutral (0), and positive (1). When Twitter posts contain information supporting the 
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concept of tanking, these tweets are labeled as positive. Neutral tweets may include any 
posts that are in the middle of supporting and disliking tanking. Negative tweets often 
represent the fans’ disappointment toward tanking. 
After conducting sentiment analysis on tanking tweets, the overall sentiment 
toward tanking is clear. Specifically, of 161,702 tanking tweets collected, 75% of Twitter 
posts exhibit negative views toward the idea of tanking. Of the rest, 17.7% of posts are 
labeled as neutral and 7.3% of tweets show some positive attitudes toward the concept of 
tanking. Here, I report the summaries of the sentiment of tanking tweets at the team, 
month, and season levels. First, sentiment analysis revealed that 2015-2016 Chicago 
Bulls season had the strongest negative sentiment (-0.881) on tanking among all team-
season observations in the dataset. Table 4.2 lists the ten worst sentiments on tanking and 
the related seasons and teams. Additionally, Figure 4.4 plots the short-term sentiment of 
tanking tweets for the Bulls, as an example, with LOESS that displays a general trend of 
sentiments over the seasons.  
At the season level, it is interesting to note that while tanking tweets 
predominately exhibit negative views, the sentiment toward tanking becomes more 
positive over the five-season period. For instance, the sentiment of tanking tweets is 
scored at -0.703 in the 2013-2014 season but raises to -0.600 in the 2017-2018 season 
(Figure 4.5). A simple linear regression of the sentiment on NBA seasons also shows a 
positive relationship between the NBA seasons and sentiment toward tanking, indicating 
that fans seem to become more acceptable to the idea of tanking over the years. Another 
interesting result is that the 2013-2014 NBA seasons have the lowest sentiment on 
tanking among five seasons examined in this dissertation. The extremely low sentiment 
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might come from the fact that the Sixers were alleged to have tanked for the entire season. 
Specifically, as noted before, Sam Hinkie who was renowned for employing the tanking 
strategy to rebuild NBA franchises embarked on his career as the general manager of the 
Sixers in the 2013-2014 season. While the Sixers did not publicly admit to tanking, the 
appointment of Sam Hinkie and his subsequent public statements might make fans 
speculate that the team would be committed to tanking (Rappaport, 2017). 
The sentiment of tanking tweets is also examined at the month level (Figure 4.6). 
Figure 4.6 suggests sentiment regarding tanking seems to improve first and then 
deteriorates over the course of the season. Early in the season (October and November), 
the sentiment on tanking is scored at -0.670 and -0.638 respectively. Then, the sentiment 
becomes more positive as the season progresses and reaches the peak in December. 
However, the sentiment appears to aggravate toward the end of the season (March and 
April). This observation is expected as abundant studies have shown that teams are more 
likely to tank toward the end of the NBA regular season (Price et al, 2010; Taylor & 
Trogdon, 2002). With an increasing number of tanking teams approaching the conclusion 
of an NBA season, more fans may express disappointment and displeasure in March and 
April (Price et al, 2010; Taylor & Trogdon 2002). 
4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The previous section summarized the two variables of interest and revealed some 
interesting observations. This section focuses on reporting regression analysis results for 
four research questions proposed in Chapter 2. 
Table 4.3 reports the main findings. Column (1) presents the results for models 
using the entire dataset of 5,945 games. While all 5,945 games played between the 2013-
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2014 to 2017-2018 NBA seasons are available to examine, some of which are not useful 
in addressing the proposed research questions. The reason rests on the fact that not all 
tanking teams aim to deliberately lose games to improve draft position. For instance, 
certain playoff teams may tank for other purposes such as reserving energy for the 
playoffs or competing for better playoff seeds (McManus, 2019). The current dissertation 
focuses on analyzing the behavior of tanking for draft picks and how fans perceive such 
behavior. Thus, subsets of games featuring non-playoff teams that have incentives to tank 
for draft picks are used in models. 
Table 4.3, Column (2) contains the findings for the first research question whether 
consumer perceptions of tanking for home teams will affect attendance in the short run. 
To ensure the Twitter data can effectively reflect consumer perceptions of tanking for 
draft picks, the analysis employs 2,870 games featuring home teams that do not enter the 
playoffs in the observed season. The estimated coefficient on the short-term volume of 
tanking tweets for home teams is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, meaning that 
the higher volume of tanking discussions for home teams prior to an NBA game will 
result in lower demand for sport. The parameter estimate on the short-term sentiment of 
tanking tweets for home teams is insignificant, indicating that fan attitudes toward 
tanking related to home teams do not affect demand for NBA games in the short term. 
The second research question investigates the possibility that consumer 
perceptions of tanking may have a prolonged impact on consumer interest in NBA games. 
To address this question, the same model specifications as Column (2) is used but a 
different set of 2,829 NBA games featuring home teams that did not qualify for playoffs 
in the previous season are examined. Recall that the long-term variables measure the 
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volume and sentiment of tanking from the previous season, while the short-term variables 
are calculated by using tweets posted within 31 days prior to the start of an NBA game. 
The estimation results in Column (3) show that the extensive discussion of tanking for 
home teams from the prior season can negatively affect NBA attendance as the estimated 
parameter on the long-term volume of tanking tweets for home teams is negative and 
significant at the 0.05 level. Yet, the estimated coefficient on the long-term sentiment of 
tanking tweets for home teams is not significant, implying that fan views of tanking for 
home teams formed in the past do not influence their attendance decisions. 
The third and fourth questions aim to explore whether consumer perceptions of 
tanking for visiting teams will affect attendance decisions in both the short-term and 
long-term. To answer these questions, 2,769 games featuring away teams that are not 
eligible for playoffs in the observed season and 2,774 games featuring away teams that 
did not compete in playoffs in the prior season are employed in models in Column (4) 
and Column (5) respectively. The findings in Column (4) reveal that the parameter 
estimate on the short-term sentiment of tanking tweets for away teams is positive and 
significant at the 0.05 level, indicating that how fans view visiting teams’ tanking 
behavior prior to an NBA match positively affect their attendance decisions. However, 
the estimate on the short-term volume of tanking tweets for visiting teams is not 
significant, meaning the decision to attend an NBA game does not hinge on how well 
local fans are aware of tanking related to away teams. Additionally, the results in Column 
(5) suggest estimated coefficients on the long-term volume and sentiment of tanking 
tweets for away teams are not significant at the 0.05 level, signaling that consumer 
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perceptions of tanking for visiting teams do not influence local fans’ attendance decisions 
in the long run. 
Lastly, two falsification tests are performed to test whether model specification 
are correctly identified (Goldhaber & Chaplin, 2015). To perform falsification tests, I add 
a set of variables that represents future consumer perceptions of tanking. Specifically, the 
future volume and sentiment of tanking tweets for both home and visiting teams are 
calculated by using tweets posted within 31 days after an NBA game. If the model 
specifications are correct, future perceptions of tanking should not have any effects on 
attendance decisions. The estimation results are displayed in Table 4.3, Column (6) and 
Column (7).  The parameter estimates on future perceptions of tanking for home and 
visiting teams are all insignificant at the 0.05 level. Thus, my models pass falsification 
tests. 
Moving to control variables, the estimated parameter on home team quality is 
significant and positive in all models in Table 4.3, suggesting that high quality home 
teams tend to attract more fans to games. The different estimation results are observed on 
away team quality variables. Specifically, the findings in Column (1), (2), and (3) show a 
positive and significant relationship between away team quality and NBA attendance, 
while the estimations in Column (4), (5) do not. 
Economic factors such as population and income level may be important 
predictors of attendance in the NBA (Borland & MacDonald, 2003). The results in 
Column (1), (3), and (4) show that MSA population is positively associated with demand 
for NBA games. However, the finding in Column (2) concludes that there is a statistically 
negative link between population and NBA attendance. Additionally, the estimation in 
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Column (5) suggests that population may not be a determining factor of consumer 
interest in sport. Unlike the population variables revealing different relationships under 
various models, the parameter estimates on coincident indexes measuring monthly 
economic conditions in states produce consistent outcomes across all models. 
Specifically, the findings suggest coincident indexes have a statistically positive 
connection with demand for sport at the 0.05 level, indicating a stronger economy leads 
to higher attendance at NBA games. The number of professional sports teams in the same 
market as NBA teams does not seem to affect attendance. Only the results in Column (1) 
display a negative relationship between Competition and consumer interest in NBA 
games, meaning that stronger market competition will lead to lower demand for 
attendance. All other models suggest that market competition is not a key determinant of 
consumer interest in the NBA. 
NBA game attendance may also be determined by game uncertainty (Mills & Fort, 
2014). The current dissertation uses point spreads from betting markets to approximate 
game uncertainty. The model specifications also include a quadratic term on point 
spreads in order to catch the nonlinear relationship between game uncertainty and 
demand for sport. The estimation results suggest that the parameter estimate on the 
squared point spreads is positive and significant in Column (1), (2), (3), and (5), while the 
estimated coefficient on point spreads is not significant, except in Column (1). These 
findings suggest that the lowest attendance will appear when point spreads are 0, where 
game outcomes are most unpredictable. Thus, this dissertation does not offer evidence 
that more uncertain NBA games will increase ticket sales.  
 83
The literature on demand for sport also suggested that the facility age might play 
an important role in changing NBA attendance (Coates & Humphreys, 2005). The present 
dissertation produces inconsistent conclusions regarding the connection between facility 
age and consumer interest in NBA games. The findings in Column (3) and (5) suggest 
that facility age does not affect NBA attendance, while the result in Column (2) reveals a 
concave relationship between these two variables. Additionally, the parameter estimate 
on facility age is negative in Column (1), implying that demand will decline after the 
opening of a new sports facility. Furthermore, the result in Column (4) indicates a convex 
relationship between facility age and NBA attendance, meaning that attendance drops 
after a sports facility opens but increases toward the end of the lifespan of the facility. 
The timing of NBA games seems to be a significant predictor of NBA attendance 
(Watanabe, Yan, Soebbing, & Fu, 2019). In this dissertation, the estimated coefficients 
on holiday games are positive and significant at the 0.05 level across all models. For 
instance, the estimation in Column (2) indicates that holiday games will attract 8.3% 
more fans than non-holiday games. The estimated coefficients on other timing variables 
such as the day of a week and the month of a year produce same conclusions as the prior 
studies of demand for sport. Due to limited space, their estimation results are not reported 
here. 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
To test the strength of the findings, I perform a number of robustness checks. First, 
the short-term volume and sentiment variables for both home teams and away teams are 
recalculated by using tweets posted within 15, 62, and 93 days before the tipoff of an 
NBA game rather than 31 days used in the main models. Originally, the construction of 
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the two variables of interest assumes that fans on average book tickets to NBA games 
within a month prior to the start of an NBA game (Mills, Salaga, & Tainsky, 2016), 
However, some fans may choose to buy tickets earlier or later than the one-month 
window. Thus, it is important to check the robustness of the findings under different 
timeframes. As such, I re-estimated models by using variables calculated from 15-day, 
62-day and 93-day data. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 4.4. In general, all models produce 
similar results as the main models in terms of the sign and significance. For models 
investigating the effect of perceptions of tanking for home teams on attendance in Table 
4.4, Column (1), (2), and (3), the estimated parameters on the short-term volume of 15-
day, 62-day and 93-day tanking tweets for home teams are negative and significant at the 
0.05 level, meaning the increasing discussion of tanking related to home teams prior to an 
NBA game undermines consumer interest. Comparing the magnitude of the parameter 
estimates across three models, it appears that tanking discussions occurred within 93 days 
before the start of an NBA match has the highest impact on attendance and such effects 
diminish as the time window shortens. In other words, the awareness of tanking formed 
within at least 93 days before an NBA game can negatively affect attendance decisions. 
Moving to the short-term sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams, the findings are 
consistent across three robustness check models in Table 4.4, Column (1), (2), and (3) 
that the estimated coefficients are not significant at the 0.5 level. Despite different ways 
of calculating sentiments, all models draw the same conclusion that fan attitudes toward 
tanking for home teams measured prior to an NBA match do not affect consumer 
behavior in attending NBA games. 
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For models studying the impact of perceptions of tanking for visiting teams on 
attendance in Table 4.4, Column (4), (5), and (6), the estimated coefficients on the short-
term sentiment of 15-day, 62-day and 93-day tanking tweets for visiting team are all 
positive and significant at the 0.5 level. These estimation results are consistent as the 
main models in terms of the sign and significance. The magnitude of these coefficients is 
slightly different. Table 4.4, Column (4) shows that the sentiment of 15-day tanking 
tweets for visiting teams has the smallest positive impact on attendance, while the 
sentiment of 93-day tanking tweets for away teams has the largest positive impact on 
attendance among three models. Additionally, the estimated coefficients on the short-
term volume of 15-day, 62-day, and 93-day tanking tweets for visiting teams are not 
significant at the 5% for all models. These findings are similar to the main models that 
the broad discussion of tanking for away teams prior to an NBA game will not affect 
local fans’ attendance decisions. 
The second robustness check concerns the long-term impact of consumer 
perceptions of tanking on demand for NBA games. Recall that the long-term volume and 
sentiment of tanking tweets are calculated from tanking tweets posted in the previous 
NBA season and are employed to quantify the past consumer perceptions of tanking. To 
calculate the long-term variables, an entire NBA season spanning from July 1 to June 30 
is considered. However, Twitter posts over the entire NBA may not adequately quantify 
the past consumer perceptions of tanking. For instance, it is likely that fans may develop 
their perceptions of tanking over the course of the season when they watch games (Aday 
& Phelan, 2016). Therefore, the second robustness check uses tanking tweets published 
during the prior regular season, rather than the entire season, to construct the long-term 
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variables. The models in Table 4.3, Column (3) and (5) are re-estimated with the revised 
long-term variables and the results are reported in Table 4.4, Column (7) and (8). 
Overall, the findings with the new long-term variables are largely the same as the 
main models, indicating the robustness of findings pertaining to the long-term effect of 
perceptions of tanking on demand for sport. Specifically, the results in Table 4.4, Column 
(7) show that the long-term volume of tanking tweets for home teams is negatively 
related to attendance. This conclusion is similar to the previous analysis. However, the 
findings related to the long-term sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams are different 
from the main models. As shown in Column (7), the robustness check model suggests 
that the long-term sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams negatively relates to 
attendance as the estimated coefficient is negative and significant at the 0.05 level, while 
the main models revealed an insignificant relationship. One possible explanation for this 
difference is that fans who developed negative attitudes toward tanking for home teams 
during the prior regular season are curious about what teams have changed in the current 
season. As such, local fans may express higher demand for home games this year, 
although they may hold negative attitudes on tanking for home teams in the previous 
season. Focusing on the estimations pertaining to the long-term variables for visiting 
teams, the results in Column (8) are the same as prior examinations that neither the 
awareness nor attitudes toward tanking for visiting teams can influence local fans’ 
attendance decisions in the long run. 
The third robustness check re-estimated the effect of the volume of tanking tweets 
on attendance without adjusting for team tweets. Recall that NBA team tweets are 
collected to normalize the quantity of tanking tweets since big market teams such as Los 
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Angeles Lakers and New York Knicks may intrinsically have more social media posts, 
and thus have a higher quantity of tanking tweets than other NBA teams (Robinson & 
DeSchriver, 2003; Késenne, 2000). Here, the first five models listed in Table 4.3 are re-
estimated without counting team tweets in the volume variables. The results are presented 
in Table 4.5. Overall, the significance and sign of the parameters of interest are consistent 
as the main models. The only exception is that the estimate parameters on the short-term 
volume of tanking tweets for visiting teams become positive and significant at the 0.05 
level across five modes in Table 4.5 but are insignificant in the main models. This 
difference may arise from the fact that the volume of tanking tweets is not normalized, 
and thus is not a proper proxy for the fan awareness of tanking. Nevertheless, this 
robustness check generally reconfirms the finding that the increasing awareness of 
tanking for home teams can significantly harm consumer interest in both the short term 
and long term. In sum, the above three robustness checks largely show consistent results 
as the main models. Thus, I am confident of the robustness of the findings in these 
models. 
The fourth robustness check relates to the concern that Elo ratings may be highly 
correlated with the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets variables, as the calculation 
of Elo ratings may take teams’ tanking behavior into consideration (Silver & Fischer-
Baum, 2015; Soebbing & Humphreys, 2013). To perform the fourth robustness check, 
seven main models are re-estimated by using team winning percentage prior to the start 
of NBA game for home and away teams (Win_home, Win_away) instead of Elo ratings. 
The estimation results can be found in Table 4.6. In sum, the parameter estimates on the 
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variables of interest in Table 4.6 have similar significance and sign as estimated 




Figure 4.1 Short-term Volume of Tanking Tweets for the Philadelphia Sixers from the 2013-2014 to 2017-2018 Season

































































































































































































































































































































Figure 4.4 Short-term Sentiment of Tanking Tweets for the Chicago Bulls from the 2013-2014 to 2017-2018 Seasons 
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Table 4.1 Ten Highest Volume of Tanking Tweets by Team and Season 
 
Rank Team Season Volume 
1 Philadelphia 76ers 2014-2015 0.597 
2 Chicago Bulls 2017-2018 0.588 
3 Philadelphia 76ers 2013-2014 0.485 
4 Dallas Mavericks 2017-2018 0.431 
5 Utah Jazz 2013-2014 0.378 
6 Atlanta Hawks 2017-2018 0.369 
7 Memphis Grizzlies 2017-2018 0.367 
8 Milwaukee Bucks 2013-2014 0.285 
9 Orlando Magic 2017-2018 0.250 
10 Phoenix Suns 2017-2018 0.206 




Table 4.2 Ten Lowest Sentiment of Tanking Tweets by Team and Season 
 
Rank Team Season Sentiment 
1 Chicago Bulls 2015-2016 -0.881 
2 New York Knicks 2013-2014 -0.847 
3 New York Knicks 2015-2016 -0.805 
4 Orlando Magic 2015-2016 -0.802 
5 Minnesota Timberwolves 2016-2017 -0.795 
6 Utah Jazz 2015-2016 -0.787 
7 Sacramento Kings 2014-2015 -0.783 
8 Brooklyn Nets 2016-2017 -0.762 
9 Philadelphia 76ers 2013-2014 -0.759 
10 Charlotte Hornets 2014-2015 -0.757 
 League Average  -0.653 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Short_Volume_Home -0.075*** -0.074*** -0.102*** -0.057** -0.054* -0.078*** -0.058** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.021) 
Short_Sentiment_Home -0.010 -0.010 0.005 -0.001 -0.015 -0.009 -0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) 
Long_Volume_Home -0.213*** -0.088 -0.299*** -0.195*** -0.163** -0.086 -0.196*** 
 
(0.039) (0.046) (0.044) (0.056) (0.057) (0.046) (0.056) 
Long_Sentiment_Home -0.017 -0.055 0.011 0.028 0.024 -0.060 0.027 
 
(0.025) (0.043) (0.044) (0.035) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) 
Short_Volume_Away 0.009 0.004 -0.012 -0.0002 -0.029 0.002 -0.012 
 
(0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) 
Short_Sentiment_Away 0.011 0.005 0.009 0.042** 0.036** 0.005 0.042** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) 
Long_Volume_Away 0.006 0.014 0.032 -0.046 -0.052 0.014 -0.047 
 
(0.034) (0.044) (0.045) (0.037) (0.038) (0.044) (0.037) 
Long_Sentiment_Away -0.036 -0.030 -0.041 -0.017 0.021 -0.031 -0.015 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.031) 
Future_Volume_Home 
     
0.011 
 




     
-0.017 
 




      
0.024 
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(0.016) 
Future_Sentiment_Away 
      
0.002 
       
(0.015) 
Facility_Age -0.011*** 0.015*** 0.004 -0.016*** -0.006 0.015*** -0.016*** 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Facility_Age2 0.0002 -0.001*** -0.0003 0.0003* 0.00001 -0.001*** 0.0003* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Point_Spread 0.001* 0.001 0.001 -0.0001 0.0003 0.001 -0.00005 
 
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Point_Spread2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0002* 0.0003*** 0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Home 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Away 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 
 
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00005) (0.00004) (0.0001) 
Population 0.0003* -0.001*** 0.002*** 0.0004* 0.0004 -0.001*** 0.0004* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Coincident_Index 0.004** 0.008*** 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004* 0.008*** 0.006*** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Competition -0.052* 0.015 0.063 -0.050 -0.035 0.017 -0.050 
 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) 
Holiday 0.111*** 0.083** 0.096** 0.118*** 0.102*** 0.083** 0.119*** 
 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
Observations 5945 2870 2829 2769 2774 2870 2769 
Note: The dependent variable is log(attendance). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.  
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Table 4.4 Regression Analysis Results for Robustness Check 1 and 2 
 







 15 days 62 days 93 days 15 days 62 days 93 days Regular season 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Short_Volume_Home -0.040** -0.139*** -0.185*** -0.022 -0.115*** -0.177*** -0.177*** -0.127*** 
 
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.016) (0.027) (0.031) (0.025) (0.028) 
Short_Sentiment_Home -0.013 -0.003 0.0002 -0.007 -0.009 -0.001 0.018 -0.025 
 
(0.010) (0.015) (0.017) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) 
Long_Volume_Home -0.081 -0.091* -0.093* -0.189*** -0.193*** -0.195*** -0.212*** -0.090* 
 
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.033) (0.044) 
Long_Sentiment_Home -0.049 -0.058 -0.062 0.033 0.026 0.026 -0.205*** 0.014 
 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.042) (0.036) 
Short_Volume_Away 0.010 0.003 -0.013 0.009 0.00003 -0.010 -0.015 -0.034 
 
(0.013) (0.023) (0.027) (0.012) (0.020) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Short_Sentiment_Away 0.002 -0.008 -0.003 0.027* 0.037* 0.050** 0.003 0.046** 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015) 
Long_Volume_Away 0.013 0.013 0.020 -0.050 -0.046 -0.038 0.044 -0.023 
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.031) 
Long_Sentiment_Away -0.029 -0.032 -0.034 -0.018 -0.015 -0.019 -0.043 0.015 
 
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.026) (0.029) 
Facility_Age 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.008* -0.006 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Facility_Age2 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0003* 0.0003* 0.0003* -0.0004** -0.00001 
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(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Point_Spread 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.001 0.0003 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Point_Spread2 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004*** 0.0002* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Home 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Away 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0003*** 0.0001 
 
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00005) 
Population -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.0004* 0.002*** 0.0004* 
 
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Coincident_Index 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.004* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Competition 0.014 0.017 0.017 -0.052 -0.050 -0.052 0.077* -0.034 
 
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.037) (0.030) 
Holiday 0.083** 0.081** 0.078** 0.117*** 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.093** 0.104*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.027) 
Observations 2870 2870 2870 2769 2769 2769 2829 2774 
Note: The dependent variable is log(attendance). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001. 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Short_Volume_Home -0.035*** -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.027*** -0.028*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Short_Sentiment_Home -0.012 -0.011 -0.002 -0.005 -0.017 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Long_Volume_Home -0.006*** -0.002 -0.006*** -0.005** -0.004* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Long_Sentiment_Home -0.025 -0.052 -0.008 0.024 0.018 
 
(0.025) (0.043) (0.044) (0.035) (0.036) 
Short_Volume_Away 0.009* 0.010 0.010 0.006 -0.002 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) 
Short_Sentiment_Away 0.010 0.003 0.006 0.041** 0.036** 
 
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Long_Volume_Away 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Long_Sentiment_Away -0.032 -0.025 -0.036 -0.008 0.022 
 
(0.020) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030) (0.029) 
Facility_Age -0.011*** 0.015*** 0.007 -0.016*** -0.006 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Facility_Age2 0.0002 -0.001*** -0.0004* 0.0003* 0.00000 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Point_Spread 0.0005 0.0005 -0.00004 -0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Point_Spread2 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0003*** 0.0001 0.0001 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Home 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 
(0.00004) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Elo_Away 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0002** 0.0001** 
 
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00005) 
Population 0.0004* -0.001*** 0.001*** 0.0004** 0.0004* 
 
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Coincident_Index 0.004*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.005** 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Competition -0.063** 0.001 0.008 -0.059* -0.046 
 
(0.023) (0.031) (0.037) (0.030) (0.030) 
Holiday 0.108*** 0.082** 0.094** 0.113*** 0.097*** 
 
(0.021) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.027) 
Observations 5945 2870 2829 2769 2774 
Note: The dependent variable is log(attendance). *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.  
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Table 4.6 Regression Analysis Results for Robustness Check 4 
 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Short_Volume_Home -0.131*** -0.093*** -0.142*** -0.116*** -0.129*** 
 
(0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
Short_Sentiment_Home -0.011 -0.012 0.005 -0.004 -0.018 
 
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) 
Long_Volume_Home -0.307*** -0.120** -0.361*** -0.291*** -0.267*** 
 
(0.040) (0.046) (0.045) (0.057) (0.058) 
Long_Sentiment_Home -0.002 -0.075 0.011 0.034 0.015 
 
(0.026) (0.044) (0.045) (0.036) (0.037) 
Short_Volume_Away -0.013 -0.010 -0.032 -0.013 -0.038 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.022) 
Short_Sentiment_Away 0.012 0.004 0.011 0.041** 0.032* 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) 
Long_Volume_Away -0.074* -0.047 -0.017 -0.079* -0.070 
 
(0.034) (0.043) (0.044) (0.037) (0.039) 
Long_Sentiment_Away -0.023 -0.017 -0.028 -0.001 0.037 
 
(0.021) (0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.030) 
Facility_Age -0.016*** 0.012** 0.006 -0.020*** -0.011* 
 
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
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Facility_Age2 0.0004*** -0.001*** -0.0003 0.0005** 0.0002 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Point_Spread 0.002*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002** 
 
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Point_Spread2 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 
 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Win_Home 0.180*** 0.049* 0.161*** 0.179*** 0.181*** 
 
(0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
Win_Away 0.155*** 0.125*** 0.135*** 0.043 0.075** 
 
(0.015) (0.019) (0.020) (0.026) (0.025) 
Population 0.0003 0.0004 0.002** 0.0003 0.0003 
 
(0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Coincident_Index 0.002 0.004* 0.003 0.004* 0.002 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Competition -0.057* 0.053 0.079* -0.054 -0.037 
 
(0.024) (0.033) (0.039) (0.032) (0.031) 
Holiday 0.114*** 0.086** 0.098** 0.130*** 0.103*** 
 
(0.022) (0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.028) 
observations 5866 2832 2791 2733 2740 





The previous chapter presented some interesting results from the regression 
analysis regarding the impact of consumer perceptions of tanking on demand for NBA 
games. Chapter 5 focuses on interpreting these findings. First, I provide a thorough 
discussion of the analysis of outcomes reported in Chapter 4. Next, theoretical 
contributions as well as practical implications of the findings are discussed. 
5.1 DISCUSSION 
The present dissertation examining the impact of consumer perceptions of tanking 
on demand for NBA games has a few important findings. First, the estimation results in 
Table 4.3, Column (2) suggest that the short-term volume of tanking tweets for home 
teams is negatively related to attendance in the NBA. Recall that the short-term variable 
quantifies the intensity of tanking discussions within 31 days before the tipoff of an NBA 
game. Hence, this result provides evidence that when fans become more aware of tanking 
for home teams prior to a match, they tend to have lower demand for NBA games. This 
finding is not surprising, considering the fact that tanking teams purposely losing games 
jeopardizes the spirit of sports competition, which requires participants to exert the best 
effort in sporting contests (Tayade, Bhamare, Kamble, & Jadhav, 2013). Therefore, when 
fans perceive the existence of tanking, they may lose interest in attending these games. 
The above conclusion is also slightly different from the observation provided by 
Preston and Szymanski (2003) that cheating behavior in sport may not significantly 
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undermine consumer interest in sport. Preston and Szymanski (2003) listed some 
anecdotal evidence that betting-related match fixing in MLB and the English Premier 
League (EPL) did not seem to hurt demand for sport as the popularity of these sports 
leagues continued to grow after gambling scandals. While tanking is distinct from other 
match-fixing behaviors in that it is not strictly prohibited by league rules (Lenten et al., 
2018), empirical evidence from this dissertation shows that perceived tanking behavior 
does negatively affect consumer demand for sport. 
Another important finding from this dissertation is the long-term volume of 
tanking tweets for home teams is negatively related to NBA attendance. Recall that the 
long-term variable gauges the intensity of tanking discussions from the previous season. 
This conclusion implies that tanking discussions from the past has a persistent influence 
on present attendance decisions. In other words, teams with a tradition of tanking may not 
only suffer from lower attendance in the current season but also in the future seasons due 
to perceived tanking behavior. 
The above findings that the increasing awareness of tanking undermines 
consumer interest in both the short term and long term are worth further discussion. The 
prior studies of tanking noted that tanking behavior in sport damaged the quality of sports 
competitions, which generally encompasses the quality of sports teams and game 
uncertainty (McManus, 2019; Price et al., 2010; Soebbing & Mason, 2009; Vamplew, 
2018). The current dissertation offers additional evidence of the adverse impact of 
perceived tanking on consumer demand for sport. Considering teams do not publicly 
admit tanking, fans may not always correctly recognize tanking behavior from poor team 
performance (Paxton, 2018). Thus, how fans perceive the idea of tanking may become a 
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critical factor in their attendance decisions. The findings from the regression analysis 
draw upon the previous research of demand for sport and offer evidence that the more 
fans are aware of the existence of tanking, the lower demand for sport will appear. 
Second, my models conclude that neither the short-term nor long term sentiment 
of tanking tweets for home teams has an impact on attendance in the NBA. Recall that 
sentiment variables measure the fan attitudes toward the idea of tanking. These findings 
suggest that even if fans hold more positive attitudes toward tanking for home teams, 
game attendance will remain the same. Similarly, fans with more negative attitudes on 
tanking for home teams do not seem to lower game attendance. This finding seems 
surprising as numerous studies concluded that consumer sentiment is a key predictor of 
purchase behavior (Huth, Eppright, & Taube, 1994; Nguyen & Claus, 2013). One 
possibility is that some fans develop habit to attend sporting events even they hold 
negative sentiment on tanking behavior (Ge, Humphreys, & Zhou, 2020). Another 
possible explanation of this result is that fans may not be interested in attending games 
featuring tanking teams, despite their support of the idea of tanking for home teams. For 
instance, fans may root for home teams to deliberately lose games for draft picks which 
can help regain competitiveness in the near future (Wade, 2013). Yet, such positive views 
on tanking do not create more incentives for fans to attend games in the current and next 
season. 
Finally, this dissertation concludes that consumer perceptions of tanking for 
visiting teams will affect attendance decisions. Specifically, the data analysis reveals that 
there is a statistically positive relationship between the short-term sentiment of tanking 
tweets for visiting teams and demand for NBA games. There were concerns that tanking 
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teams may create negative externalities when they play road games (Whitney, 2005). 
That is, tanking teams undermining consumer interest in NBA games may incur 
additional costs to the rest of the league without being penalized (Humphreys & Nowak, 
2017). Both positive and negative externalities are common in the sport industry 
(Downward & Rasciute, 2011). For instance, Humphreys and Johnson (2020) noted that 
NBA super stars such as Michael Jordan, Magic Johnson, and Larry Bird could produce 
significant positive externalities to the rest of the league. When NBA star players play 
road games, the number of tickets sold in opponents’ arenas are expected to spike. Yet, 
opponents benefiting from more ticket sales do not pay salaries for these star players 
(Humphreys & Johnson, 2020). Similarly, the current dissertation finds evidence of 
negative externalities of perceived tanking behavior related to visiting teams. If local fans 
have strong negative views toward the opponent’s tanking strategy prior to an NBA 
match, then attendance will be lower even though tanking is not directly linked to home 
teams. 
In addition to the two variables of interest, this dissertation reveals important 
findings in control variables that are worth discussion. First, despite some variations in 
results showing the impact of facility age on NBA attendance, the general trend suggests 
that consumer interest in NBA games declines as sports facilities age. In particular, the 
full model utilizing the entire dataset of NBA games ranging from the 2013-14 to 2017-
2018 seasons shows the positive estimator on the linear term of facility age and the 
insignificant coefficient on the quadratic term (Leadley & Zygmont, 2005). This finding 
shows NBA attendance will fall as NBA arenas becomes older, which is similar to what 
Coates and Humpreys (2005) estimated. Second, most models in this dissertation show 
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the estimated coefficients on the quadratic term of point spreads are positive and 
significant and are insignificant on the linear term. Such results suggest a convex 
relationship between game uncertainty and demand for NBA games. In other words, this 
conclusion indicates that local fans may like predictable games more than unpredictable 
matches, which is consistent with what Coates et al. (2014) and Demmert (1973) 
suggested but does not support the UOH. Third, the market competition, quantified by the 
number of MLB, NFL, and NHL teams in the same market as an NBA team, does not 
show a significant relationship with NBA attendance in most models. On the contrary, 
the full model reveals a negative link, which is consistent with the conclusion drawn from 
many prior studies (e.g., Demmert, 1973; Whitney, 2005). The different estimation 
outcomes may arise from the fact that some models in this dissertation use subsets of 
NBA games. Considering that the market competition variable does not change 
significantly across the seasons, these models using subsets of data may not contain 
sufficient variations in the market competition variable, and thus produce insignificant 
estimators. Nevertheless, the results in the full model offer similar findings as preceding 
research that market competition may limit consumer interest in NBA games (Morse, 
Shapiro, McEvoy, & Rascher, 2007). Fourth, this inquiry finds control variables such as 
team quality, population, economic conditions, and holiday games largely have positive 
relationships with consumer demand in the NBA. These findings have similar 





5.2 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
This dissertation makes several theoretical contributions. First, it contributes to 
the literature of demand for sport by exploring the impact of tanking in sport, behavior 
that may undermine the integrity of competition (Borland & MacDonald, 2003; Villar & 
Guerrero, 2009). While prior studies noted the importance of understanding the effect of 
unethical team behavior such as tanking and match-fixing on consumer demand 
(McManus, 2019; Preston & Szymanski, 2003), none of them attempted to quantitatively 
measure such impacts. The controversial but prevailing topic tanking serves as a great 
means to understand how sports fans will respond to unethical behavior in sport 
(Howman, 2012; Wolfers, 2006). Hence, the current dissertation develops a new set of 
factors estimating perceptions of tanking and uses the NBA as a context to systematically 
analyze how these variables may affect NBA attendance. As such, the findings from the 
current disseratation strengthen the theoretical understanding of demand for sport in 
relation to unethical team behavior. 
Second, the current dissertation extends previous examinations of demand for 
NBA attendance (Hausman & Leonard, 1997; Leadley & Zygmont, 2005; Mills & Fort, 
2014). Despite research interests in understanding factors that affect consumer demand 
for sport, the recent studies of demand for NBA attendance seem scant. This dissertation 
employs the attendance data from five recent NBA seasons between 2013-2014 to 2017-
18 and re-examines a wide range of variables that are deemed as key determinants of 
NBA attendance. The findings suggest that variables such as facility age quality, game 
uncertainty, team quality, population, economic conditions, and holiday games are 
significant predictors of attendance decisions for NBA games, largely echoing previous 
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test results (Hansen & Gauthier, 1989; Morse et al., 2007). As such, the present 
dissertation advances the literature of NBA attendance by examining key determinants of 
demand for NBA games with more recent data. 
Third, this dissertation provides theoretical contributions in understanding tanking 
behavior in sport. Prior tanking research primarily focused on developing evidence of 
tanking in sport (Fornwagner, 2019; Price et al., 2010; Soebbing & Humphreys, 2013; 
Taylor & Trogdon, 2002). For instance, the seminal tanking study conducted by Taylor 
and Trogdon (2002) concluded NBA teams would attempt to purposely lose games after 
being removed from playoff contention. Despite the extensive examinations of tanking in 
sport, none of the earlier research studies how consumers may respond to the idea of 
tanking (Borland et al., 2009; Price et al., 2010; Soebbing & Humphreys, 2013; Taylor & 
Trogdon, 2002). The present dissertation explores the relationship between perceptions of 
tanking and consumer interest in sport and is the first one to quantitatively explore 
consumer reaction to tanking behavior in sport. As such, this dissertation adds significant 
theoretical contributions to the tanking literature. 
Fourth, this dissertation advances sport management research of sentiment 
analysis on social media. With the increased use of social media, a range of sports 
research have begun to examine content from social media such as Twitter, Facebook, 
and Instagram, in order to form a better understanding of consumer sentiment (Abeza, 
O’Reilly, & Reid, 2013; Filo et al., 2015; Yan, Pegoraro, & Watanabe, 2018; Yan, 
Watanabe, Shapiro, Naraine, & Hull, 2019). Unlike previous sport social media studies 
that predominately use lexicon-based methods to estimate sentiments from social media 
posts, this dissertation adopts machine learning models to extract sentiments from social 
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media content (Chang, 2019). Using social media Twitter combined with sentiment 
analysis techniques, my work reveals the change of consumer perceptions of tanking over 
time, and offers a rigorous measure of fans’ reactions to underperformance in sport. 
5.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Through constructing short-term and long-term variables quantifying consumer 
perceptions of tanking, this dissertation develops robust evidence regarding how 
consumer interest in sport will be affected by perceived tanking behavior. Such evidence 
may provide several important practical implications for policymakers. First, my work 
indicates that both the increasing awareness of tanking for home teams and negative 
attitudes toward tanking related to visiting teams can significantly undermine consumer 
interest in attending sporting events. Furthermore, it is evident that not only does the 
extensive discussion of tanking prior to NBA matches damage fan interest, but also the 
tanking discussions from the last season damage interest too. This finding suggests the 
widespread discussion of tanking around the league can produce both instant and 
persistent negative impacts on demand for sport. To maintain consumer interest in 
sporting contests, it is, therefore, critical for policy makers to restrain the speculation of 
tanking and retain a less negative image of tanking around the league. For instance, the 
NBA fined the Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban $600,000 for publicly admitting 
tanking in the 2017-2018 NBA season (NBA, 2018). Such penalizations may effectively 
reduce the broad discussion of tanking among fans and create a more positive league 
image, and thus can help avoid a drastic falloff of demand for NBA games due to 
perceived tanking behavior (Paxton, 2018). 
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Second, this dissertation offers a tool for practitioners to monitor consumer 
perceptions of tanking. Using social media platform Twitter, my work concludes that fans 
in general hold negative views toward tanking and the sentiment seems to improve over 
the seasons. Additionally, compared to other NBA seasons included in the dataset, the 
2013-2014 and 2017-2018 NBA seasons witnessed the extensive discussion of tanking. 
The above conclusions show Twitter could be considered as an effective medium to 
understand how fans perceive the concept of tanking (Yu & Wang, 2015). Furthermore, 
my work also provides detailed steps of calculating the volume of tanking tweets as well 
as the process of using machine learning models to extract sentiments from Twitter posts 
(Schuckert, Liu, & Law, 2015; Xiang, Du, Ma, & Fan, 2017). Taking the volume and 
sentiment of tanking tweets together, practitioners can form a holistic view of consumer 
perceptions of tanking that may help improve decision makings related to tanking 






This dissertation centers on examining the behavior of sports teams tanking for 
draft picks and thoroughly analyzes the impact of consumer perceptions of tanking on 
demand for sport. To successfully measure perceptions of tanking, the current 
dissertation used social media posts from Twitter, an online platform where people 
express thoughts and opinions on various topics (Morstatter, Pfeffer, Liu, & Carley, 
2013). By analyzing tanking-related Twitter posts, the two variables are proposed to 
represent consumer perceptions of tanking, the volume and sentiment of tanking tweets. 
Notably, the volume of tanking tweets reflects the fans’ awareness of tanking and is 
calculated by counting the number of tanking tweets posted over a period of time. The 
data analysis of this variable indicates the 2013-2014 and 2017-2018 NBA seasons 
contained considerately more tanking discussions on Twitter than other seasons examined 
within this dissertation. This observation signals that fans are well aware of the existence 
of tanking in these two NBA seasons. 
The second variable, the sentiment of tanking tweets, represents consumer 
sentiment on tanking and is quantified by calculating the average sentiment expressed in 
tanking tweets. Sentiment analysis with machine learning models is performed to classify 
each tanking tweet into one of the sentiment classes, positive, neutral, and negative 
(Kouloumpis, Wilson, & Moore, 2011). The sentiment variable then counts the average 
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sentiment from tanking tweets posted within a particular period of time. Overall, the 
Twitter data suggests that a considerable portion of tanking tweets contain negative 
sentiments, meaning fans in general hold negative views toward tanking. Additionally, 
the season average sentiment on tanking shows continues improvement, implying that 
fans become more acceptable to the idea of tanking over the years. 
After building two variables measuring consumer perceptions of tanking, I 
estimate their relationship with NBA attendance. The regression analysis offers clear 
evidence that the short-term volume of tanking tweets for home teams prior to an NBA 
game is negatively related to attendance decisions. This evidence suggests the extensive 
discussion of tanking related to home teams significantly affect ticket sales in the short 
run. This dissertation also finds a lasting effect of the volume of tanking discussions for 
home teams on demand for NBA games. Specifically, the results conclude that the broad 
discussion of tanking related to home teams from the prior NBA season can significantly 
reduce consumer demand for games in the current season, indicating that the adverse 
effect of the volume of tanking discussions on attendance can persist for a while. 
While the volume of tanking tweets for home teams has significant impacts on 
NBA attendance in both the short term and long term, the sentiment of tanking 
discussions for home teams does not appear to have an effect on demand for NBA games. 
The results from a number of regression models suggest that neither the short-term nor 
long-term sentiment of tanking tweets for home teams is statistically related to attendance 
decisions. Although Twitter data collected in this dissertation shows that fans develop 
more positive attitudes toward tanking over the seasons, the findings from statistical 
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models predict that improved sentiment on tanking does not seem to help attract fans to 
NBA arenas. 
This dissertation further analyzes how consumer perceptions of tanking for 
visiting teams can affect NBA attendance. Specifically, econometric models reveal that 
only the short-term sentiment of tanking discussions for visiting teams seems to be 
significant in positively changing demand for NBA matches among all variables 
examined. That is, local fans who hold more negative views toward visiting teams’ 
tanking behavior prior to an NBA match are less likely to attend games. This suggests 
that perceived tanking behavior for away teams can produce the adverse impact on 
demand for home games. 
6.2 LIMITATIONS 
The current dissertation is not without limitations. First, selection bias may exist 
in Twitter data (Culotta, 2014). While the number of Twitter users has grown 
tremendously over the past few years, the cohort may not represent the general 
population (Bae & Lee, 2012). For instance, it is estimated the Twitter users are overall 
younger and wealthier than the U.S. public (Wojcik & Hughes, 2019). As such, Twitter 
posts may not fully reflect consumer perceptions of tanking. Despite this concern, a 
thorough literature review shows that Twitter posts can effectively gauge consumer 
sentiment (Daniel, Neves, & Horta, 2017). For instance, a wide range of research 
studying the stock market revealed that investor sentiment calculated from Twitter posts 
could successfully predict stock price (McGurk et al., 2019). These inquiries provide 
evidence that opinions and feelings on social media platforms can as least partially 
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exhibit market sentiment. Therefore, I strongly believe that tanking posts gathered from 
Twitter well represent the fans’ feelings of tanking. 
Second, in performing sentiment analysis, the initial step of manually labeling the 
sentiment of tanking tweets may involve some subjectivity (Liu, 2010). To ensure the 
quality of manual classification, a few cautious steps were taken in the labeling process 
(McGurk et al., 2019). First, I invite an expert with strong domain knowledge to label 
tanking tweets. Second, the coder is asked to spend at least 30 seconds on labeling each 
tweet. Third, repeated tweets are randomly assigned to label. Any repeated tweets with 
inconsistent labels will be removed from the sample. The results show that only 0.4% of 
tweets are wrongly labeled and thus discarded. Fourth, I asked another coder who does 
not have a strong background in tanking to label the same set of tweets as the main coder. 
Comparing labeling results shows that 42% of labels are matched, meaning there is some 
degree of consensus between two coders on the sentiment of tanking tweets. However, as 
the expert has more domain knowledge in tanking than the other coder, its labels are 
eventually used in the training set. Despite these precautions, it is critical to note that 
some subjectivity may still exist in the labeling process. 
6.3 FUTURE STUDIES 
There are a number of areas for future research that emerges from the topics in 
this dissertation. Future study could explore new draft policies that will mitigate tanking 
issues while reserving their original functions of maintaining competitive balance in 
sports leagues. The present dissertation develops evidence that consumer perceptions of 
tanking can hurt attendance. As such, it is crucial for sports leagues to amend existing 
draft policies to restrain tanking behavior in sport. However, it is equally important to 
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note that draft systems were initially designed to improve competitive balance in sport, 
which is a key determinant of consumer demand for sport (Grier & Tollison, 1994; 
Sanderson & Siegfried, 2003). Therefore, future studies may carefully design new draft 
systems that can not only serve as a scheme to maintain competitive balance but also 
discourage tanking behavior in sport. 
Future studies may also explore the effectiveness of the new draft policy instituted 
in 2019. Recall in Figure 1.1, the new NBA draft system reduces the possibility for the 
worst record teams to receive the No.1 draft pick from 25% to 14%. While the new 
system intends to diminish tanking incentives in the NBA, it is unclear whether it will 
work as planned. Therefore, future research may use team performance data to further 
investigate whether lowering the probability of acquiring the No.1 draft pick will 
discourage tanking behavior in the NBA. 
In addition, future research can follow this dissertation to examine the relationship 
between league policies designed to discourage tanking behavior and consumer sentiment 
regarding tanking. For instance, the NBA league office instituted the play rest policy in 
2017 and fined Mark Cuban $600,000 for publicly admitting tanking in 2018. Such 
actions aim to preserve a positive image of the league regarding tanking. Yet, it is unclear 
whether these efforts are effective in changing fans’ minds regarding the league’s tanking 
problem. The present dissertation uses the sentiment of tanking tweets to quantify 
consumer sentiment toward tanking and can also be used to examine the impact of the 
league’s tanking related policies on fans’ sentiment toward tanking.
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